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Exploiting the Joint Employer Doctrine:
Providing a Break for Sweatshop Garment Workers
Shirley Lung*
I. INTRODUCTION
Bo Yee, a seamstress in Oakland, California, stitched dresses for the
Lucky Sewing Co., a subcontractor for fashion designer Jessica
McClintock.1 When she and co-workers were laid off, Lucky Sewing
never paid them the wages they were owed.2 The women were to be
paid $5 for sewing dresses that retailed for $175. 3 In addition to the
problem of unpaid wages, Bo Yee described her job as "like being a
prisoner in a sealed cage": 4
All the windows were locked. They wouldn't let you go to the
bathroom. They had "No loud talking" signs posted. There were
about 20 of us there working ten hours a day, seven days a week,
endlessly, without rest. Most of the workers were from mainland
China, although some came from Hong Kong and there were a few
Latinos.5
When Bo Yee and the other garment workers demanded their unpaid
wages from the factory owner, they encountered stiff resistance.6
According to Lucky Sewing Co. workers, "the boss' daughter called the
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1. MIRIAM CHING YOON LOUIE, SWEATSHOP WARRIORS: IMMIGRANT WOMEN WORKERS
TAKE ON THE GLOBAL FACTORY 41 (2001).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 50.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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police on us because we wanted our back pay. They are the ones that
owed us money, but they still used the police to kick us out!"7
Like Bo Yee, Kwan Lai described prison-like conditions as she
sewed clothing for the Donna Karan New York ("DKNY") label at a
unionized factory in mid-town Manhattan, 8 where the average salary for
sixty to seventy hour workweeks was $270:9
If we were two minutes late we were docked one half-hour of our pay.
We had to put heads down at all times once we started working. No
looking up. No talking to anyone. Can you imagine? A big room
with rows and rows of machines and all of us, looking down. Three
surveillance cameras watched everything we did. They checked our
purses before we left at the end of the day. No going to the
bathroom-it was often padlocked. No water, with the drinking
fountain broken. No making or receiving phone calls, not even for
emergencies. 10
Kwan Lai and her co-workers sought the assistance of two workers'
centers, the Chinese Staff and Workers' Association ("CSWA") and the
National Mobilization Against Sweatshops ("NMASS"), to recover the
back wages owed by their employer. I I The manufacturer responded
harshly, taking its garments to another factory. 12  The plant
subsequently closed, leaving seventy workers unemployed. 13 Despite
the fact that the factory shut down, Kwan Lai and her co-workers vowed
to carry on their fight to make DKNY assume responsibility for the
sweatshop conditions in its factory. 14  After meeting with female
garment workers from other factories in New York City and college and
law students who were NMASS members about their case and the need
to fight back, Kwan Lai and her co-workers picketed a Donna Karan
store. 15
7. Id.
8. Nat'l Mobilization Against Sweatshops, Ain't I a Woman: The Stories of Two DKNY
Factory Workers, at http://www.nmass.org/nmass/aiw/stories.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2003)
[hereinafter Ain't I a Woman].
9. LOUIE, supra note 1, at 43.
10. Ain't I a Woman, supra note 8. Kwan Lai was fired the first time for taking a call
informing her that her young daughter was sick in school. LOUIE, supra note 1, at 54. After
successfully fighting for her reinstatement, she was later laid off while other workers were
retained. Id. at 55. After her discharge, she continued to organize other workers to demand
payment of unpaid overtime. Id. at 57.
1I. LOUIE, supra note 1, at 44.
12. Id. at 57.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. The workers' demands did not seem overreaching:
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The stories of Bo Yee and Kwan Lai are not unique. 16 Kwan Lai and
seven other co-workers from her factory claim that they are owed
between $250,000 and $300,000 in unpaid overtime. 17 A survey by the
United States Department of Labor ("DOL") of ninety-three New York
City garment factories in 1999 found that 1621 workers were owed
$815,065 in back wages. 18 Recently, a group of New York City factory
workers producing garments for the Kathy Lee Gifford, Jaclyn Smith,
and Tracey Evans labels won a settlement of $400,000 for back
wages. 19 A 1995 DOL spot check of Los Angeles contractors revealed
that forty-six factories improperly withheld more than $500,000 from
approximately 600 workers. 20 Moreover, federal and state enforcement
agencies recovered only $1.3 million of $73 million owed to California
garment workers in 1999.21 Quarterly enforcement reports, released
under former Secretary of Labor Robert Reich's "NO SWEAT"
[Donna Karan] has to take responsibility to reinstate all of us, pay the wages and
damages we're owed, that all her clothes should be made in factories obeying the law,
that 75 percent of her clothes be made locally, and that she say sorry to us for the
treatment we suffered making her clothes.
Id.
16. Almost all factories owe at least one month of wages. Some owe for nine weeks, or
longer. Sometimes the bosses owe them for half a year. Maybe the boss gives a
little money to string them along. The boss keeps saying, "Oh, I don't have the
money now, but when I do, I'll give it to you."
Id. at 40 (footnote omitted). "[T]he sweatshop problem has become typical rather than
exceptional in the industry." Robert J.S. Ross, The New Sweatshops in the United States: How
New, How Real, How Many, Why? 13 (1998) (unpublished paper, on file with author)
[hereinafter Robert Ross].
17. The Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund ("AALDEF') has filed a class
action lawsuit seeking compensation on behalf of up to 300 factory workers in New York City
who make Donna Karan clothing. Liu v. Donna Karan Int'l, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 4221 (WK), 2001
WL 8595, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2001) (order denying motion to dismiss). The workers claim
minimum wage and overtime violations. Id. at * 1. For a description of other lawsuits brought by
garment workers to recover owed wages and overtime pay, see, for example, Economic Justice,
OUTLOOK (Asian Am. Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, New York, N.Y.), Summer 1999, at 2, 6; Major
Victor), in Garment Manufacturer Case, OUTLOOK (Asian Am. Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, New
York, N.Y.), Fall 1999, at 2; Tracey Evans Pays $400,000 Settlement in Sweatshop Case,
OUTLOOK (Asian Am. Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, New York, N.Y.), Spring 2000, at 6.
18. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Conditions in New York City's Garment Industry
Unchanged, but Tougher Enforcement Leads to Arrests (Oct. 15, 1999), available at
http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/opa/archive/opa99300.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2003)
[hereinafter U.S. Dep't of Labor, 1999].
19. LOUIE, supra note 1, at 42-43.
20. Samantha C. Halem, Slaves to Fashion: A Thirteenth Amendment Litigation Strategy to
Abolish Sweatshops in the Garment Industry, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 397, 407-08 (1999).
21. Andrew Elmore, Comment, State Joint Employer Liability Laws and Pro Se Back Wage
Claims in the Garment Industry: A Federalist Approach to a National Crisis, 49 UCLA L. REV.
395, 427 (2001).
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campaign, routinely exposed scores of contractors owing many
hundreds of thousands of dollars in back wages. 22
Clearly, sweatshops are not exclusively an overseas problem. In fact,
there is growing congruence between the conditions in apparel factories
in the United States and the Third World.2 3 Moreover, the current legal
and regulatory system of the United States is riddled with loopholes,
rendering basic labor protections illusive for sweatshop garment
workers. For example, Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA") 24 to guarantee a minimum hourly wage and overtime pay for
hours exceeding a forty-hour workweek. Manufacturers and retailers,
however, are able to successfully skirt liability under the FLSA by
shifting responsibility for wages onto marginal subcontractors. 25
Workers are left with little recourse as weak labor laws enable
undercapitalized contractors to flout labor standards with impunity.
Without increased joint liability of contractors, manufacturers, and
retailers, one of the most basic human rights-being paid for one's
work-is little more than a dream for most garment workers, even when
they fight valiantly to enforce their rights.
This Article will examine the promise of the joint employer
doctrine26 under the FLSA to provide relief to sweatshop garment
workers. Part II will give an overview of the conditions and causes of
the revival of garment sweatshops in the United States. 27 Part III will
outline the development of the joint employer doctrine, contrasting the
limitations of the control theory to the promise of the economic realities
22. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Labor Department Releases Fourth Quarter
1999 Garment Enforcement Report (May 1, 2000) (noting that over $700,000 in back wages was
owed to garment workers in fourth quarter of fiscal year 1999), available at http://www.dol.gov/
opa/media/press/opa/archive/opa2000058.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2002); Press Release, U.S.
Dep't of Labor, Labor Department Releases Third Quarter 1999 Garment Enforcement Report
(Feb. 24, 2000) (noting that over $900,000 in back wages was owed to workers in third quarter of
fiscal year 1999), available at http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/opa/archive/opa2000058.htm
(last visited Oct. 11, 2002). The DOL's "No Sweat" campaign was a public relations strategy
designed to shame apparel companies into policing law-breaking contractors. Andrew Ross,
Introduction to No SWEAT: FASHION, FREE TRADE & THE RIGHTS OF GARMENT WORKERS 29
(Andrew Ross ed., 1997) [hereinafter Andrew Ross]. The DOL's Quarterly Enforcement Reports
named contractors who owed back pay, and the manufacturers who did business with these
contractors. Id. In addition, the DOL circulated a "Fashion Trendsetters List" containing the
names of companies that produced and sold clothes without the use of sweat labor. Id.
23. Compare infra notes 44-49 and accompanying text (describing conditions in United States
sweatshops), with infra note 50 (providing reference to a description of Third World sweatshops).
24. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000).
25. The practice of subcontracting, by which manufacturers parcel the sewing and cutting of
apparel to contractors, lies at the heart of the sweatshop system.
26. See infra notes 172-79 and accompanying text (defining the joint employer doctrine).
27. See infra Part II (discussing the current state of sweatshops in the United States).
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approach for moderating the view of contract law as the exclusive
source of rights for workers. 28 Part IV will assess the possibilities and
pitfalls of the current standard through an examination of Lopez v.
Silverman,29 the principal joint employer case pertaining to garment
manufacturers. 30  Finally, Part V will offer recommendations for the
development of the joint employer doctrine so that it can become an
effective tool for extending labor protections to garment workers. 31
II. SWEATSHOPS AND THE GARMENT INDUSTRY
A. Conditions
The garment industry has a notorious history of sweatshops 32 dating
back to the late nineteenth century. 33  The expanded use of the joint
employer doctrine by workers to fight sweatshops occurs as current
working conditions rival those in factories at the turn of the twentieth
century. 34 The resurgence of modern slave labor in the industry was
catapulted into the national limelight in 1995 by the widely publicized
accounts of seventy-one Thai immigrants who had been subjected to
involuntary servitude in El Monte, California.35 After being smuggled
28. See infra Part III (discussing the development of judicially created tests that are used to
analyze employer-employee relationships and the current state of the joint employer doctrine).
29. Lopez v. Silverman, 14 F. Supp. 2d 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
30. See infra Part IV (discussing the impact of Lopez v. Silverman on future development of
the joint employer doctrine).
31. See infra Part V (discussing recommendations for future application of the joint employer
doctrine).
32. The term "sweatshop" is used to refer to factories that regularly violate multiple federal
and/or state labor laws governing minimum wages, overtime pay, child labor, industrial home
work, and safety and health conditions. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, "SWEATSHOPS" IN THE
U.S.: OPINIONS ON THEIR EXTENT AND POSSIBLE ENFORCEMENT OPTIONS (Report No.
GAO/HRD-88-130 BR 16, 1988) [hereinafter GAO 1988 REPORT].
33. See, e.g., ROGER D. WALDINGER, THROUGH THE EYE OF THE NEEDLE: IMMIGRANTS AND
ENTERPRISES IN NEW YORK'S GARMENT TRADES 50-54 (1986); Andrew Ross, supra note 22, at
12; Bruce Goldstein et al., Enforcing Fair Labor Standards in the Modern American Sweatshop:
Rediscovering the Statutory Definition of Employment, 46 UCLA L. REV. 983, 1055-61 (1999).
34. See, e.g., FREDERICK H. ABERNATHY ET AL., A STITCH IN TIME 270-71 (1999); CTR. FOR
ECON. & SOC. RIGHTS, "TREATED LIKE SLAVES": DONNA KARAN, INC. VIOLATES WOMEN
WORKERS' HUMAN RIGHTS 2 (1999), available at http://www.cesr.org/programs/us%20program/
dkny.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2003) [hereinafter CESR]; LOUIE, supra note I, at 4-5; Andrew
Ross, supra note 22, at 12-13; Kenneth C. Crow, The Return of the Sweatshop, N.Y. NEWSDAY,
Mar. 20, 1994, at 74, available at 1994 WL 7398123; Bob Herbert, Buying Clothes Without
Exploiting Children, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1995, at A27, available at LEXIS, News Library, The
New York Times File.
35. See, e.g., Kenneth B. Noble, Thai Workers Are Set Free in California, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
4, 1995, at Al, available at LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File; George White,
Garment 'Slaves' Facing Ouster, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1995, at DI, available at 1995 WL
9813913. After their release, the workers filed a lawsuit charging the operators of the El Monte
296 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 34
into the United States, the workers were imprisoned in a compound and
forced by the operators of the facility to sew garments for manufacturers
and retailers under slave-like conditions.36 The plight of the seventy-
one workers was the most dramatic example of domestic sweatshop
labor in recent years. Yet, outside of the spurt in publicity surrounding
the El Monte workers, are the stories of Bo Yee, Kwan Lai, and
hundreds of thousands of other garment workers who toil in the
shadows of our major urban garment centers. 37
The pervasive lawlessness of sweatshops in the garment industry is
reflected in DOL statistics indicating that more than half of the nation's
garment factories are in violation of several labor laws. 38 According to
a General Accounting Office ("GAO") report in 1994, garment
sweatshops have been on the rise since 1989.39 At least one-third of the
6000 garment shops in New York are sweatshops, as are 4500 of Los
Angeles's 5000 factories, and 400 of Miami's 500 shops. 40 In 1997, the
DOL conducted the first investigation-based compliance survey of New
York City garment shops.4 1 Sixty-three percent of the shops were in
violation of FLSA provisions, and nearly nine-out-of-ten of the
compound, several manufacturers, and several retailers with violations of civil ights, tort laws,
labor laws, and civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") provisions. See
Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F. Supp. 1450, 1458 (C.D. Cal. 1996). The workers claimed that the
manufacturers and retailers were liable for federal and state labor law violations based on the
doctrine of joint employer. Id. at 1460. In addition to the civil suit, the operator of the compound
was criminally charged with involuntary servitude, conspiracy, kidnapping by trick, and
smuggling individuals in violation of United States immigration laws. Id. at 1458. See generally
Julie A. Su, Making the Invisible Visible: The Garment Industry's Dirty Laundry, 1 J. GENDER
RACE & JUST. 405,405-06, 413 (1998).
36. Su, supra note 35, at 406-07.
37. The three largest garment centers in the United States are New York City, Los Angeles,
and San Francisco. Leo L. Lam, Comment, Designer Duty: Extending Liability to Manufacturers
for Violations of Labor Standards in Garment Industry Sweatshops, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 623, 628
(1992). In 1995, then Secretary of Labor Robert Reich estimated the number of garment sewers
and cutters in the industry at one million. Alan Finder, How an American Industry Gets Away
with Slave Labor, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1995, § 4, at 7 (interviewing Robert Reich), available at
LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File. Recent estimates put the number of garment
manufacturing workers in New York City at 93,000, Los Angeles at 120,000, and San Francisco
at 20,000. LOUIE, supra note 1, at 32-33.
38. LOUIE, supra note 1, at 4.
39. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, "GARMENT INDUSTRY": EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE
PREVALENCE AND CONDITIONS OF SWEATSHOPS 4 (Report No. GAO/HEHS-95-29, 1994)
[hereinafter GAO 1994 REPORT].
40. Id. at 5.
41. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Labor, U.S. Department of Labor Compliance Survey Finds
More than Half of New York City Garment Shops in Violation of Labor Laws (Oct. 16, 1997),
available at http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/opa/archive/opa97369.htm (last visited Mar. 2,
2003).
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inspected Chinatown shops were breaking the law.42  A 1999 DOL
survey showed that the compliance rates of New York City factories
were no better than in 1997. 43
Statistics alone do not convey the toll of sweatshops on the daily lives
of garment workers, many of whom are female immigrants from Asia
and Latin America. Workers are frequently subjected to compulsory
overtime, without the payment of benefits, overtime pay, or minimum
wages.44 For many garment workers, forty-hours-a-week is considered
part time.45 They are often forced to work seventy to one hundred hour
workweeks 46 and are pitted against one another to compete for longer
hours.47 The factories, where they spend much of their daily lives, are
dangerous and unhealthy places. Specifically, workers contend with
overcrowded workspaces, hazardous electrical wiring, unsanitary
bathrooms, blocked fire exits, poor ventilation, and insufficient
lighting.48 Equally distressing is the oppressive treatment by factory
owners. Workers endure constant supervision, surveillance, arbitrary
discipline, intimidation, harassment, and control of movement.49 These
conditions are not so different from those of Third World sweatshops. 50
The already low wages in the industry have plummeted in recent
years. Wages in New York City garment factories have dropped by
about 30% in the last five years, 51 with current hourly rates between $2
and $6.52 The low wages of garment workers in Los Angeles are
worsened by racial stratification-Chinese women average $5464
annually, other Asian women average $7500, and Mexican women
42. Id.
43. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 1999, supra note 18.
44. LOUIE, supra note 1, at 36; CESR, supra note 34, at 8.
45. Nat'l Mobilization Against Sweatshops, It's About TIME!-Campaign for Workers'
Health, at http://www.nmass.org/nmass/wcomp/workerscomp.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2003)
[hereinafter It's About TIME!].
46. CESR, supra note 34, at 8; see LOUIE, supra note I, at 36. See generally It's About
TIME!, supra note 45.
47. LOUIE, supra note 1, at 36. Older seamstresses work "mere" ten-hour days, but are
pressured to come in more and work longer hours like their younger counterparts. Id.
48. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 'SWEATSHOPS' IN NEW YORK CITY: A LOCAL EXAMPLE
OF A NATIONWIDE PROBLEM (Report No. GAO/HRD-89-101BR 8, 26, 1989) [hereinafter GAO
1989 REPORT].
49. See LOUIE, supra note 1, at 54.
50. See Nat'l Labor Comm., Rhetoric Versus Reality: The Role of U.S. Companies in China
and the Truth About Factory Conditions (describing conditions in sweatshop factories in China
that produce goods for North American manufacturers), available at http://www.nlcnet.org/
reportOO/rhetoric-reality.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2003).
51. CESR, supra note 34, at 8.
52. Id.
2003]
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average $6500. 53 Additionally, industrial home work and the piece rate
system further contribute to low sweatshop wages. Home work
encourages the underreporting of hours, making it easier for contractors
to conceal noncompliance with labor laws.54 Workers who sew at home
earn as little as $2 an hour. 55 Under the piece rate system, a worker is
paid based on each garment she sews or each sewing procedure she
completes.56 As a result, the piece rate system operates to heighten the
frenetic pace of work, yet many contractors reduce the piece rate if a
worker is a fast sewer.57
The impact of sweatshop conditions on garment workers, their
families, and communities is far-reaching. Long hours, grueling work
paces, and unsafe conditions cause many workers to develop serious
health problems. 58 These illnesses jeopardize not only their ability to
earn a livelihood 59 but also their physical capacity to enjoy life outside
of work. Further, sweatshop conditions undermine the ability of
garment workers to nurture and build their families and communities.
Forced to spend most of their waking hours in the factories because of
low wages or compulsory overtime, most garment workers have little
time to spend with their families or to participate in building their
communities. 60
B. Why Do Sweatshops Exist?
Historic strikes in the twentieth century, organized by garment
workers protesting miserable working conditions, led to the rise of a
militant labor movement. 61  Its victories resulted in New Deal
legislation that regulated child labor, home work, piecework, minimum
53. LOUIE, supra note 1, at 33.
54. Lam, supra note 37, at 636.
55. LOUIE, supra note 1, at 33.
56. Id. at 35; Lam, supra note 37, at 636.
57. CESR, supra note 34, at 8.
58. Id.; It's About TIME!, supra note 45. These illnesses include blindness, bronchial asthma,
carpel tunnel syndrome, and back and joint disorders. It's About TIME!, supra note 45.
59. CESR, supra note 34, at 9; It's About TIME!, supra note 45.
60. Interview with Jo Ann Luri, Program Director, National Mobilization Against
Sweatshops, in Brooklyn, N.Y. (May 6, 2002).
61. ABERNATHY ET AL., supra note 34, at 30-32; Michael Piore, The Economics of the
Sweatshop, in No SWEAT: FASHION, FREE TRADE, AND THE RIGHTS OF GARMENT WORKERS
135, 136 (Andrew Ross ed., 1997); Andrew Ross, supra note 22, at 11, 30; Bruce G. Herman,
SEW What? The New York Apparel Industry in the Global Economy: Inevitable Decline or
Possibilities for Industrial Upgrade? 33-34 (1998) (unpublished paper prepared for Workshop on
"Global Production and Local Jobs: New Perspectives on Enterprises, Networks, Employment
and Local Development Policy," International Institute for Labor Studies, Mar. 9-10, 1998) (on
file with author).
[Vol. 34
20031 Exploiting the Joint Employer Doctrine
wages, overtime, and safety conditions. 62 As unions gained a foothold
in the apparel industry, they used the collective bargaining process to
secure additional gains by standardizing wages and conditions.63 These
developments improved the conditions of garment workers, although
Asian immigrant workers and other workers of color did not equally
share in these gains. 64 It is important to ask, why is it "back to the
future" 65 in the garment industry after a period of relative stability? 66
1. The Subcontracting System as a Major Culprit in the Creation and
Maintenance of Sweatshops
According to the GAO, a principal cause of declining employment
conditions in garment factories is the "intense price-competitive
dynamics" of the subcontracting system. 67  The market and structural
forces in the industry create an incentive and willingness on the part of
garment manufacturers and contractors to break labor laws. 68 Workers
bear the brunt of unpaid wages, uncompensated compulsory overtime,
62. Piore, supra note 61, at 136.
63. ABERNATHY ET AL., supra note 34, at 31-32 (discussing the various kinds of collective
bargaining agreements used to standardize wages and conditions, including agreements in which
manufacturers pledged to outsource work only to those contractors designated by the union);
Andrew Ross, supra note 22, at 30 (arguing that organized labor acted as a "powerful co-
guarantor" along with the government of the social contract between labor and capital that
emerged from the strikes of garment workers in the early twentieth century); Herman, supra note
61, at 33-34.
64. Herbert Hill, Chinese Immigrant Workers and the Contemporary Labor Movement, 7 NEW
POLITICS 149, 155-57 (2000) (describing the impact of the exclusionary policies of the
International Ladies Garment Workers' Union on African American, Puerto Rican, and Chinese
garment workers). The article also recounts the anti-Chinese animus expressed by the early
leadership of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations ("AFL-
CIO"). Id. at 149-53.
65. PETER CAPPELLI, THE NEW DEAL AT WORK 51 (1999). Cappelli uses this phrase to refer
to the contemporary return to subcontracting practices and other employment structures that were
widespread in the nineteenth century. Id. at 50-52, 57.
66. Andrew Ross argues that sweatshops were never fully eradicated; they just "dropped out
of view, and lived on in the underground economy." Andrew Ross, supra note 22, at 1I.
67. GAO 1994 REPORT, supra note 39, at 9; see also GAO 1989 REPORT, supra note 48, at 53
(stating that unions and other observers attribute the existence of sweatshops in part to the
contracting system).
68. GAO 1994 REPORT, supra note 39, at 9, 13; see, e.g., Dennis Hayashi, Preventing Human
Rights Abuses in the U.S. Garment Industry: A Proposed Amendment to the Fair Labor Standards
Act, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 195, 199 (1992) (explaining that manufacturers prefer subcontracting
because "they can control how much or how little contractors are paid, and they can take
advantage of the prevailing presumption that they are not liable for wage violations in their
contractors' sweatshops").
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grueling workloads, and unsafe workplaces as manufacturers shift
responsibility for labor standards onto marginal contractors. 69
The practice of subcontracting has strong historical roots in the
garment industry. 70 Under the subcontracting system, intermediaries
are interposed between workers and the company for which the work is
performed. 71 Typically, garment manufacturers design, merchandise,
and market apparel, while engaging contractors to sew and assemble the
apparel.72 Contractors, on the other hand, are responsible for recruiting,
hiring, and supervising employees to produce garments according to the
timetable and specifications established by manufacturers. 73
The links between subcontracting and sweatshop garment factories
are inextricable. 74 Discovery of abuses in the subcontracting system
during the late nineteenth century led to legislation, monitoring, and
consumer education campaigns that called for manufacturer liability. 75
Reformers saw manufacturers as culpable parties because they benefited
from the deplorable wages and conditions imposed by contractors who
operated sweatshops in tenements tucked away from the public eye.76
Current measures for addressing problems in modem sweatshops
resemble efforts of the past.77
69. See Lora Jo Foo, The Vulnerable and Exploitable Immigrant Workforce and the Need for
Strengthening Worker Protective Legislation, 103 YALE L.J. 2179, 2185-88 (1994) (describing
the lack of accountability endemic to the subcontracting system, as garment manufacturers
delegate work to undercapitalized and marginal contractors who escape wage judgments by going
out of business and reopening under a new name).
70. WALDINGER, supra note 33, at 50-52 (tracing the current division of labor between
manufacturers and contractors to practices in the late 1800s); Goldstein et al., supra note 33, at
1056-57 (discussing the different types of sweatshops and their origins). Three types of
contractor-related sweating systems for garment production existed in the late 1800s: inside
shops, outside shops, and home work. Goldstein et al., supra note 33, at 1057-61.
71. See CAPPELLI, supra note 65, at 52-53 (describing the widespread use of subcontracting
in major industries, including steel and mining, during the 1800s); WALDINGER, supra note 33, at
51-52 (discussing the use of intermediaries between workers and manufacturers in New York
City's early twentieth century garment industry).
72. WALDINGER, supra note 33, at 52; Andrew Ross, supra note 22, at 13.
73. WALDINGER, supra note 33, at 52; Andrew Ross, supra note 22, at 13; see also Lam,
supra note 37, at 629 (discussing the roles of the manufacturer, the contractor, and the garment
worker).
74. See, e.g., ABERNATHY ET AL., supra note 34, at 30; Foo, supra note 69, at 2185; Goldstein
et al., supra note 33, at 1055-56.
75. Goldstein et al., supra note 33, at 1061-65.
76. Id. at 1062-65.
77. See ABERNATHY ET AL., supra note 34, at 270-72 (summarizing three historical
approaches to the problem of sweatshops: federal and state regulatory power, consumer pressure,
and voluntary agreements to monitor compliance with labor laws); see also infra Part IIl
(discussing the joint-employer doctrine as a legal strategy to fight sweatshop abuses).
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It is still true today that manufacturers occupy the top of the garment
business chain and derive .significant economic benefits from the
subcontracting system. 78  For instance, manufacturers minimize
overhead expenses by passing fixed production costs, such as labor,
rent, and equipment, onto contractors. 79 They retain flexibility in
adjusting to swings in market demand without bearing the burden of
hiring and firing workers. 80 At the same time, manufacturers reap the
benefits of extreme price competition between a large supply of
contractors and skirt liability for the violation of labor standards
because they do not directly employ the garment workers who sew and
assemble their apparel. 81
Moreover, the interplay between economic forces and the
subcontracting system ensures manufacturer control over the prices paid
to contractors. 82  Specifically, manufacturers are in a position to
manipulate the contract price to achieve the cheapest rate possible. 83
For example, the prices calculated by manufacturers typically
underestimate the amount of time required to produce a piece of
garment.84  Manufacturers base their rates on the time that a
professional sample-maker would require, assuming the most
auspicious working and production conditions. 85 These calculations,
however, invariably are unrealistic because they do not account for
numerous factors that increase the cost of production. 86 These factors
include the quality of sewing specifications, supervision, tools and
equipment, the level of skill possessed by garment workers, delays
beyond the workers' control, the time needed to learn a new style, and
78. Foo, supra note 69, at 2185-86; Halem, supra note 20, at 428; Hayashi, supra note 68, at
199; Lam, supra note 37, at 629-31; Herman, supra note 61, at 18-19. Recent trends indicate the
growing power of retailers over manufacturers as the numbers of retailers dwindle through the
process of consolidation. See Andrew Ross, supra note 22. at 25-26; Elmore, supra note 21, at
400 n. 14; Herman, supra note 61, at 28-30.
79. Foo, supra note 69, at 2186: Lam. supra note 37, at 630-31; Herman, supra note 61, at
18-19.
80. Foo, supra note 69, at 2186; Lam, supra note 37, at 631.
81. Halem, supra note 20, at 428; see also GAO 1994 REPORT, supra note 39, at 9-10
(describing industry forces favoring manufacturers over contractors).
82. Foo, supra note 69, at 2186.
83. Id. at 2186-87; Hayashi, supra note 68, at 203-04; Charles R. Chaiyarachta, Comment, El
Monte is the Promised Land: Why Do Asian Immigrants Continue to Risk Their Lives to Work for
Substandard Wages and Conditions?, 19 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 173, 190-91 (1996).
84. Foo, supra note 69, at 2187; Hayashi, supra note 68, at 203.
85. Hayashi, supra note 68, at 203. In most instances, according to one organizer,
manufacturers are fully aware that workers do not toil under favorable conditions. Interview with
Jo Ann Lum, supra note 60.
86. Foo, supra note 69, at 2187; Hayashi, supra note 68, at 203.
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the rate that the contractor must pay if a garment worker, who is paid by
the piece, cannot sew enough garments to earn the minimum wage.87
Indeed, most contractors do not possess the bargaining power to
reject unfairly low contract prices from manufacturers. In 1994, the
GAO estimated that less than 1000 manufacturers, who outsourced
work to 20,000 contractors and subcontractors, dominated the
industry. 88  New contractors and subcontractors are constantly setting
up shop because there are minimal barriers to entry. 89  Many
immigrants who were once garment workers go into business with just
enough capital to rent a small space, purchase a few sewing machines,
and hire seamstresses. 90 Because they usually have limited business
experience or specialized expertise, their bargaining power is further
reduced.9 1 Additionally, the abundance of contractors produces cut-
throat competition in which contractors fiercely underbid one another,
further narrowing already slim profit margins.92 The fact that most
contracts are terminable at will also heightens the dominance of
manufacturers. 93
When the manufacturer's contract price is too low, contractors are
unable to generate sufficient revenue to simultaneously make a profit
and comply with minimum wage and overtime requirements. 94 As one
commentator observed, rather than go out of business, most contractors"sweat out" a profit from the contract price by breaking labor laws in
order to run sweatshop operations. 95  Profit-seeking, thus, means
maximizing output by forcing workers to toil unlimited hours for fixed
substandard wages at a grueling work pace.96 To further reduce fixed
87. Hayashi, supra note 68, at 203.
88. GAO 1994 REPORT, supra note 39, at 3.
89. Id.; Lam, supra note 37, at 630; Herman, supra note 61, at 10-11, 21, 32. Immigrant
families who entered the industry because of the low start-up costs involved in opening a factory
own many of the apparel factories in New York City. Herman, supra note 61, at 21.
90. Hayashi, supra note 68, at 199-200; Lam, supra note 37, at 630; Herman, supra note 61,
at 11.
91. Hayashi, supra note 68, at 200; Lam, supra note 37, at 630.
92. GAO 1989 REPORT, supra note 48, at 53; Foo, supra note 69, at 2187, 2192; Hayashi,
supra note 68, at 204; Lam, supra note 37, at 630.
93. See Hayashi, supra note 68, at 204 (noting the lack of resources available to contractors
when manufacturers refuse to pay the contract price and terminate the contract).
94. Foo, supra note 69, at 2186-87.
95. Id. at 2187; see also Goldstein et al., supra note 33, at 1055-57 (describing routine
violations of contractors "sweating" garment workers for a profit).
96. See Foo, supra note 69, at 2187 ("[I]t is to the area of labor costs that the subcontractors
inevitably turn, pushing their workers to labor longer hours at lower and lower wages-
effectively 'sweating' out the difference [between the contract price and production expenses].");
Piore, supra note 61, at 136 (arguing that the sweatshop system is based on reducing fixed costs
by maximizing hourly output).
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costs, contractors crowd as many workers as possible into small factory
spaces located in unsafe and dilapidated tenements. 97
The low prices paid by manufacturers directly affect whether garment
workers will receive minimum wages and overtime pay. Consequently,
manufacturers are primarily responsible for the flourishing of
sweatshops because of their dominance over contractors in extracting
contract prices that grossly under-represent the actual cost of
production. Without joint liability, the entities that are most culpable
and derive the greatest benefits from the subcontracting system-the
manufacturers-remain unaccountable to sweatshop workers.
2. Insufficient Resources for Enforcement Activities and Loopholes in
Labor Laws Harm Workers
The subcontracting system functions smoothly as a means of
sweating profits because shrinking resources for enforcement of labor
standards cripple efforts of workers to recover owed wages. 98 The task
of investigating sweatshops, especially in the underground economy, is
labor intensive. 99  Decreasing resources for staffing, coupled with
expanding and competing regulatory priorities, doom government
enforcement efforts to rout garment sweatshops. In the last two
decades, workers have witnessed a significant withdrawal of
government enforcement of the FLSA through de facto deregulation. 100
The GAO reported in its 1994 study of garment sweatshops that
resources for enforcement had shrunk since 1989,101 yet the agency's
regulatory objectives grew, increasing the number of laws to enforce
and employers to cover. 102 The number of investigators in the United
States Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Division ("WHD")
dropped by 17% between 1989 and 1993, while the number of
employers covered by the FLSA grew by more than 6%.103
97. Piore, supra note 61, at 137.
98. The United States Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Division ("WHD") is
responsible for investigating complaints and inspecting workplaces to assure compliance with the
FLSA. 29 U.S.C. §§ 204, 211 (2000).
99. Piore, supra note 61, at 140.
100. Robert Ross, supra note 16, at 9-10.
101. GAO 1994 REPORT, supra note 39, at 9.
102. See id. The GAO reported that addressing sweatshops in the garment industry was only
one of the agency's numerous responsibilities. Id. The WHD was also concerned with the plight
of farm workers, child laborers, and workers in other low-wage industries. Id. Further, the
mission of the WHD was expanded to include enforcement of the Family Medical Leave Act and
the Employee Polygraph Protection Act. Id.
103. Id.
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A look at enforcement activities over a longer period reveals a dire
picture. During the Carter administration, there were 1600 WHD
investigators nationwide, compared to half of that during most of the
1990s.104 One commentator estimated that the ratio has gone from one
investigator for every 56,000 workers to one for every 106,000
workers. 10 5  Another commentator estimated that the WHD has fewer
than 800 investigators for 800,000 garment workers at approximately
24,000 establishments, as well as another 122 million workers in other
industries at 6.5 million workplaces. 10 6
The under-enforcement of wage and overtime requirements is equally
evident on the local level. According to the GAO, the WHD inspected
about 9% of the garment factories in New York City between 1984 and
1988.107 A garment industry specialist reported that the New York City
Office of the WHD has twenty-five investigators covering all industries
in New York City and Long Island. 10 8 Government investigations in
California recovered only about 1.8% of owed wages in 1999.109 While
some states, such as New York and California, have enacted minimum
wage laws, overtime laws, and laws governing the registration of
garment factories, 1 0 these state enforcement trends are no different than
those nationwide. 11  Cutbacks in staffing and competing agency
priorities undermine these laws. 112
104. ABERNATHY ET AL., supra note 34, at 271; Foo, supra note 69, at 2204; Robert Ross,
supra note 16, at 10.
105. Robert Ross, supra note 16, at 10.
106. ABERNATHY ET AL., supra note 34, at 271; see also Andrew Ross, supra note 22, at 28-
29 (noting that there are only 800 federal inspectors to cover the entire industry); Elmore, supra
note 21, at 411 (estimating that the DOL has fewer than 800 investigators for 110 million
employees nationwide).
107. GAO 1989 REPORT, supra note 48, at 35-36.
108. Herman, supra note 61, at 33.
109. Elmore, supra note 21, at 427.
110. For statutes establishing a minimum wage, see CAL. LAB. CODE § 1997 (West 1998 &
Supp. 2003) and N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 650-665 (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2003). For a statute
governing payment of wages and maintenance of payroll records, see N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 190-
199 (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2003). For a statute establishing premium pay for overtime work,
see CAL. LAB. CODE § 1198 (West 1989 & Supp. 2003). For statutes requiring the registration of
garment manufacturers and contractors, see CAL. LAB. CODE § 2675 (West 1989 & Supp. 2003)
and N.Y. LAB. LAW § 341 (McKinney 2002).
111. See GAO 1989 REPORT, supra note 48, at 32, 36-37. The New York State Apparel
Industry Taskforce conducted inspections in only 5% of the garment factories in New York
between 1987 and 1988. Id. at 36. The Taskforce has had as few as five inspectors monitoring
more than four thousand garment factories. PETER KwONG, FORBIDDEN WORKERS 177 (1997).
The New York State Legislature established the New York State Apparel Industry Taskforce in
1987 with a special mandate to address sweatshops in New York City. See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 342
(McKinney 2002). The Taskforce has broad powers to investigate compliance with minimum
wage and overtime laws, payroll record-keeping and registration requirements, and prohibitions
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Government officials have failed to ensure that enforcement-staffing
levels keep pace with the number of employers to be monitored and
with the expanded regulatory objectives. Whether the failure results
from insufficient appropriations or administrative allocation of
resources, garment workers pay the price as scores of contractors, who
are repeat violators of labor laws, routinely go undetected and
unpunished. Further, current laws are riddled with gaps that leave
garment workers without recourse, even when they successfully
navigate the regulatory system to obtain favorable judgments against
employers. 113 Chief among these loopholes is the lack of laws that hold
a successor business liable for the wage debts of its predecessor where
the two represent the same financial or management interests. 114
Garment workers who obtain favorable judgments against contractors
are often unable to collect owed wages because of the ease with which
undercapitalized contractors declare bankruptcy or simply go out of
business. 115 Contractors frequently avoid paying wage judgments by
closing the business, transferring assets, and re-opening under the same
management but with a different name. 116
Workers are left in the lurch as bankruptcy laws give preference to
secured creditors over workers, corporate laws shield owners from
personal liability, and the FLSA provides no basis for workers to make
claims against the assets of a successor business. 117 For example, in
1991, a group of garment workers employed at a Brooklyn factory
on child labor. See id. §§ 343-344; GAO 1989 REPORT, supra note 48, at 49. The California
Division of Labor Standards Enforcement ("DLSE") has also experienced reduced staffing,
greater numbers of workers laboring in sweatshop factories, and shifting regulatory priorities in
favor of public works employees. Foo, supra note 69, at 2204-05. As a result, it is unlikely that
the DLSE could reinspect a sweatshop factory sooner than four years after the initial inspection.
Id. at 2205.
112. GAO 1989 REPORT, supra note 48, at 32-33, 36-39; Foo, supra note 69, at 2204-05.
The GAO stated that officials observed that enforcement priorities also contributed to limiting the
number of inspections in the garment industry. GAO 1989 REPORT, supra note 48, at 38. For
example. Occupational Safety and Health Act ("OSHA") prioritized safety inspections for
construction and manufacturing firms over apparel and restaurant firms. Id. at 38-39. Also,
many sweatshops are exempt from OSHA inspection because of their small size. Id. at 39.
113. See Foo, supra note 69, at 2188-92 (detailing the lack of legal redress for garment
workers when contractors declare bankruptcy, close and re-open shops under different names,
bounce checks, falsify payroll records, or refuse to pay valid wage judgments).
114. Id. at 2189, 2200-01 (describing the "shell game" played by contractors to evade large
wage judgments and recommending that the definition of employer under the FLSA be expanded
to hold a successor employer liable for the predecessor's wage debts when the same workforce is
used or when there is significant common management, ownership, or financial interest).
115. Id. at2189.
116. Id.
117. See id. at 2188-91, 2200-01 (describing the "legal fiction" that the closed and re-opened
businesses are separate entities under the FLSA).
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braved threats of deportation and physical intimidation to pursue legal
claims against their employers for not paying them wages for several
months.1 18  The workers held press conferences and organized
rallies.1 19 As a result of the publicity they generated, the New York
State Attorney General's Office prosecuted the contractors for failure to
pay wages and to maintain proper payroll records. 120  The contractors
were sentenced to nine months of imprisonment and were ordered to
pay a wage judgment of $80,000.121 When the contractors
"disappeared," the workers successfully organized a "stake-out" to
locate one of the contractors so that an arrest warrant could be served on
him. 122 Upon release from jail, the contractor declared bankruptcy and
persisted in his refusal to pay the workers. 123 Despite their valiance and
perseverance, and the support of several legal and community
organizations, the workers have yet to recover any portion of their owed
wages. 124
3. Lack of Meaningful Remedies for Undocumented Immigrant
Workers Who Seek to Enforce Labor Standards
The prevalence of sweatshops in major garment centers is linked, in
part, to workforces with large numbers of undocumented immigrant
workers. 125 The enactment of the Immigration Reform and Control Act
of 1986 ("IRCA") 126 heightened the vulnerable status of undocumented
workers, driving them further into the underground economy. 127
Congress enacted the IRCA to prohibit the employment of workers who
are not authorized to work in the United States. 128 The IRCA sought to
118. See KWONG, supra note 111, at 212-17; Interview with Jo Ann Lum, supra note 60.
Peter Kwong describes how the militancy of this group of garment workers at the Brooklyn
factory sparked other Chinese immigrant workers in sweatshop factories and restaurants in the
city to protest the non-payment of wages by their employers. KWONG, supra note 111, at 217-
18.
119. KWONG, supra note 111, at 215-16.
120. Id.; Interview with Jo Ann Lum, supra note 60.
121. KWONG, supra note I 11, at 215-16.
122. Id. at 216; Interview with Jo Ann Lum, supra note 60.
123. KWONG, supra note 11l, at 216.
124. Interview with Jo Ann Lum, supra note 60.
125. GAO 1994 REPORT, supra note 39, at 8.
126. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2000).
127. Hayashi, supra note 68, at 201; see Foo, supra note 69, at 2182-83; Lori A. Nessel,
Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace: The Fallacy of Labor Protection and the Need for
Reform, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 345, 381-87 (2001) (arguing that the Immigration and
Naturalization Service ("INS") should use its prosecutorial discretion in favor of undocumented
workers who exercise their statutory labor rights so as to harmonize labor and immigration
policies).
128. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2000 & West Supp. 2002).
[Vol. 34
Exploiting the Joint Employer Doctrine
curb unauthorized immigration by eliminating incentives for employers
to hire undocumented workers. 129 Congress believed this goal could be
achieved by imposing sanctions on employers who knowingly hire
undocumented workers. 130  Organized labor supported the IRCA as a
measure to protect the employment opportunities, wages, and working
conditions of United States citizens. 131
Most commentators agree that the IRCA has failed to deter illegal
immigration.132 Instead, the apparatus of documentation verification
has been used by employers to increase the repression of immigrant
workers and, in doing so, has eroded the wages and conditions of
United States citizen workers. 133 One commentator noted that "[m]any
employers readily hire immigrants with false documentation, knowing
that these workers will not risk losing a paycheck to report abuse to
labor agencies." 134 In addition, undocumented workers who organize to
protest sweatshop conditions are easy targets for employer harassment
and retaliation. The recent Supreme Court decision in Hoffman Plastics
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB 135 gutted the authority of the National Labor
Relations Board ("NLRB") to award backpay to redress unlawful
discharges of undocumented workers. 136 While undocumented workers
129. H.R. REP. No. 99-682(l), at 45-46 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5649-
50.
130. Id. The IRCA makes it unlawful for employers to knowingly hire, recruit, or refer for a
fee, anyone who is not authorized to work in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a. It imposes
requirements on employers to verify that a prospective employee is eligible to work in the United
States by requesting and inspecting documents that prove authorization to work. Id. § 1 324a(b).
In addition, employers must maintain an 1-9 form for each person hired as part of the record-
keeping system to document the verification process. Id. Employers who fail to comply with
these provisions are subject to civil fines and criminal penalties. Id. § 1324a(e)(4), (f)( I).
131. See David Bacon, Labor Fights for Immigrants, NATION, May 21, 2001 (arguing that the
AFL-CIO supported employer sanctions to protect wages for citizen workers by excluding
immigrants rather than by organizing them), available at http://www.sweatshopwatch.org/swatch/
campaigns/laborfights-may01 .html (last visited Feb. 25, 2003).
132. See Foo, supra note 69, at 2183; Hayashi, supra note 68, at 200; Muzaffer Chisti,
Address at the New York Committee on Occupational Health and Safety and City University of
New York Law School Conference on Immigrant Labor at Risk (Apr. 27, 2002). Chisti is a
policy analyst at the Migration Policy Institute of New York University School of Law.
133. Chisti, supra note 132.
134. Foo, supra note 69, at 2183.
135. Hoffman Plastics Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 122 S. Ct. 1275 (2002).
136. See id. at 1284. In Hoffman Plastics, the employer singled out four employees for lay-off
because of their support of a union-organizing campaign. Id. at 1278. The NLRB ordered
backpay to the workers, including one who disclosed that he had entered the United States
illegally and used false documentation to obtain employment with Hoffman Plastics. Id. at 1279.
It concluded that the best way to further the policies embodied in IRCA was to provide
undocumented workers with the same remedies that are available to other employees. Id. (citing
Hoffman Plastics Compounds, Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1988)). The Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the court of appeals enforcing the NLRB's order. Id. at 1285. It held that awarding
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are deemed protected by United States labor and employment laws, 137
the unavailability of backpay effectively deprives undocumented
workers of meaningful labor standards. 138 The incentives for employers
to hire, exploit, and fire undocumented workers became stronger
because the unavailability of backpay awards lowered the cost of labor
law violations. 139 There is, in fact, minimal economic liability for
illegally firing undocumented workers. Finally, for undocumented
workers, the risks associated with enforcing labor and employment
rights extend beyond the loss of a job and salary. Evidence of a
worker's unlawful immigration status, obtained by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service ("INS") as the result of an employer's unlawful
retaliation during a labor dispute, can be used to deport the worker. 140
Judicial interpretations of the interplay between immigration policy and
labor policy have rendered labor and employment protections out of
reach for undocumented workers. Undocumented workers are caught in
a "triple whammy," as unscrupulous employers exploit them, fire them
when it is convenient to do so, and illegally provide information about
them to the INS as retaliation against them when they attempt to
exercise their rights.
backpay to undocumented immigrant workers "would unduly trench upon explicit statutory
prohibitions critical to federal immigration policy, as expressed in IRCA." Id. at 1284.
137. Sure-Tan v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 891-92 (1984) (holding that undocumented workers
are covered employees under the National Labor Relations Act); EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881
F.2d 1504, 1517 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that undocumented workers are covered under Title
VII); Patel v. Quality Inn South, 846 F.2d 700, 706 (11 th Cir. 1988) (holding that undocumented
workers are protected employees under FLSA).
138. Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant Workers, the Workplace
Project, and the Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 415-16 (1995);
see also Nessel, supra note 127, at 348-49, 368; Maria L. Ontiveros, To Help Those Most in
Need: Undocumented Workers' Rights and Remedies Under Title VII, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 607, 634-36 (1994); Richard E. Blum, Note, Labor Standards Enforcement and the
Results of Labor Migration: Protecting Undocumented Workers After Sure-Tan, the IRCA, and
Patel, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1342, 1355-56 (1988); Susan Chamesky, Comment, Protection for
Undocumented Workers Under the FLSA: An Evaluation in Light of IRCA, 25 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 379, 399-401 (1988).
139. See Hoffman Plastics, 122 S. Ct. at 1287-88 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
140. See Montero v. INS, 124 F.3d 381, 384-85 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that the INS was not
precluded from using evidence, obtained as a result of employer's tip to INS, in deportation
proceeding); Velasquez-Tabir v. INS, 127 F.3d 456, 461 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that the INS
was not precluded from using evidence based on employer report to INS in immigration
proceeding to impose civil penalty for worker's fraudulent use of documents). The court in
Montero explained that "there is nothing inherently unfair about utilizing evidence obtained
during a labor dispute, nor does the existence of a labor dispute make that evidence any less
reliable." Montero, 124 F.3d at 386.
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4. Globalization of Production and the Race to the Bottom
The decline of union power, the resurgence of domestic sweatshops,
and the significant loss of local garment jobs are frequently attributed to
the effects of globalization of production. 14' Apparel imports into the
United States in 1995 were 50% greater than in 1987,142 and over 60%
of the garments currently sold in the United States are produced
abroad. 143  Manufacturers and retailers have historically outsourced
garment production as a "low-road strategy" to respond to intensified
competition from foreign imports. 144 American manufacturers began
shifting production to Japan in the 1950s and 1960s; to Hong Kong,
Taiwan, and South Korea in the 1970s; to China in the 1980s; and, most
recently, to Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. 145  This has
led to the "hemorrhaging" of domestic garment jobs. 14 6
Free trade policies and the economic restructuring of Third World
economies have buttressed the worldwide search for cheap labor by
domestic manufacturers. 147  United States trade policies promote
offshore production through the creation of free trade zones, export
processing zones, 148 and the granting of special trade privileges to
countries that give tariff-free access to products. 149  Domestic
141. SASKIA SASSEN, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 111-12 (1998); Hayashi.
supra note 68, at 196-97; Laura Ho et al., (Dis)assembling Rights of Women Workers Along the
Global Assembly Line: Human Rights and the Garment Industr,, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
383, 385-86 (1996); Andrew Ross, supra note 22, at 18, 30.
142. Herman, supra note 61, at 24.
143. Andrew Ross, supra note 22, at 15.
144. See id. at 22. The United States garment industry struggled to compete with foreign
imports by automating production, but in the labor-intensive sectors "the push for [increased]
productivity through mechanization was [supplanted] by the promise of cheap labor markets
offshore." Id.; see also ABERNATHY ET AL., supra note 34, at 16 ("[T]he international sourcing
arrangements that have been created by retailers and manufacturers over the last twenty years
reflect a quest for minimizing unit labor costs.").
145. Gary Gereffi, Global Shifts, Regional Responses: Can North America Meet the Full-
Package Challenge?, BOBBIN, Nov. 1997, at 17-18.
146. Andrew Ross, supra note 22, at 22; Herman, supra note 61, at 31 ("[Offshore
outsourcing] has been detrimental to domestic production, as shown in employment decreases
over the last twenty years."). Some believe that the rate of job loss from globalization of garment
production has reached its limit because of the advantages that local production offers in quicker
turnarounds, smaller orders, rapid adjustments to changes in fashion, and greater quality control.
See Hayashi, supra note 68, at 197; Elmore, supra note 21, at 442; Herman, supra note 61, at 30-
31, 40.
147. Andrew Ross, supra note 22, at 22-23, 26; Ellen Frank, Global Democratization:
Spotlight on the United States, 8 NEW POLITICS 15, 15-18 (2000), available at
http://www.wpunj.edu/-newpol/issue29/frank29.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2003): Ho et al., supra
note 141, at 390-91.
148. Andrew Ross, supra note 22. at 22, 23.
149. Id. at 22.
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manufacturers who export cut garments for assembly can re-import
completed garments into the United States at a reduced tariff.150
Because of the structural adjustment programs' 5' of the World Bank
and International Monetary Fund, many developing nations adopt a
model of "export-led industrialization" to attract foreign investment
through cheap labor and liberal restrictions on exports and imports. 152
Domestic workers have suffered job losses as United States firms
profit from placing their workers in direct competition with Third
World workers for the race to the bottom. 153  Third World workers
producing apparel for United States manufacturers in offshore factories
are subjected to twenty-hour workdays, sexual harassment, coerced
birth control, brutal suppression of labor organization, and starvation
wages. 154  These factors create strong market pressures on workers in
the United States to accede to plummeting wages and conditions. 155
Further, the threat of exporting production has become a potent tool for
disciplining workers and unions. 156  Employers use their ability to
relocate to threaten workers into accepting their race to the bottom. 157
Fighting to secure minimum standards-such as the right to be paid the
minimum wage for one's labor-becomes synonymous with the flight
150. Id.
151. "Structural adjustment" refers to the conditions that the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund impose on developing countries for receipt of development loans. Walden Bello,
Structural Adjustment Programs, in THE CASE AGAINST THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 285, 285-88
(Jerry Mandler & Edward Goldsmith eds., 1996); Cecilia Green, At the Junction of the Global
and the Local: Transnational Industry and Women Workers in the Caribbean, in HUMAN
RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 118, 138 n.23 (Lance A. Compa &
Stephen F. Diamond eds., 1996). Typically, a country is required to devalue its currency, lower
wages, cut government spending, privatize state-owned businesses, and abolish protective tariffs.
Green, supra, at 138 n.23.
152. See SASSEN, supra note 141, at 111-31; Ho et al., supra note 141, at 390; Andrew Ross,
supra note 22, at 22-23, 24; Frank, supra note 147, at 16-17.
153. Andrew Ross, supra note 22, at 24-25; Herman, supra note 61, at 31-32.
154. Andrew Ross, supra note 22, at 25.
155. Id. at 25; Herman, supra note 61, at 32.
156. See Frank, supra note 147, at 15 ("Whether or not businesses actually move, the
agreements [such as NAFTA] represent a credible threat to move and this threat, in and of itself,
severely compromises the negotiating position of workers and ordinary citizens."). Labor
researchers and economists report, "U.S. businesses routinely wield the threat of moving jobs
abroad precisely to weaken unions and counter organizing drives." Id.
157. Id.; see also PETER CAPPELLI ET AL., CHANGE AT WORK 23-88 (1997) (describing the
role of global competitiveness in the pressure to restructure the United States economy through
downsizing and contingent employment structures that erode wages and job security). This
proposition is predicated on the notion that United States companies have no alternative but to
drive down wages and conditions in the quest to remain globally competitive. Frank, supra note
147, at 15.
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of jobs. 158  Workers who organize against sweatshops are vilified,
blacklisted, and branded as troublemakers bent upon hurting their local
communities by causing factories to shut down and relocate. 159
Employers appeal to ties based on culture, nationalism, and kinship to
depict workers who organize "against their own" as unduly influenced
by "outsiders." 160  Even unions contribute to the de-radicalization of a
fighting spirit among workers by discouraging workers from filing
grievances for wage and overtime violations out of fear that
manufacturers will respond by outsourcing abroad. 161 Consequently,
workers battle enormous odds at great personal sacrifice to overcome
the powerful perception that they are "anti-community" when they fight
to enforce minimum labor standards. 162
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE JOINT EMPLOYER DOCTRINE
A. What Is the Joint Employer Doctrine?
Thwarted by the futility of seeking recovery from marginal
contractors, workers have pursued an array of strategies to affix liability
on apparel manufacturers for substandard working conditions. 163 These
158. Interview with Jo Ann Lum, supra note 60. According to Jo Ann Lum, garment
contractors directly exploited fears of job loss during an organizing campaign in Sunset Park,
Brooklyn, New York. Id. The contractors distributed a survey to workers in the community
stressing that the economy of the Chinese community rested upon the survival of the garment
industry. Id. The survey also preyed upon the particular concerns of immigrant workers by
asking whether workers had an alternative occupation, spoke and wrote English, and whether they
could find alternative employment if the garment industry disappeared. Id. (copy of the survey is
on file with author).
159. Id.
160. Id. Lum also recounted specific instances of the use of nationalism by ethnic media
outlets against workers who organize. Id.; see also Leti Volpp, Talking "Culture": Gender,
Race, Nation, and the Politics of Multiculturalism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1573, 1591 nn.85-86
(1996) (arguing that attributing the exploitation of immigrant sweatshop workers by immigrant
contractors to culture absolves government, manufacturers, and contractors of culpability).
161. See KWONG, supra note 11l, at 188-89 (criticizing organized labor's "cooperative
relationship" with manufacturers as garment production relocated to find cheaper labor); Hill,
supra note 64, at 151, 155, 157 (describing the "low-wage policy" of the International Ladies
Garment Workers Union and its impact on African American, Puerto Rican, and Chinese garment
workers in New York City).
162. Interview with Jo Ann Lum, supra note 60.
.163. See, e.g., Pl.'s Notice of Mot. and Mot. for Partial Summ. J. at 20-24, Bureerong v.
Uvawas, 922 F. Supp. 1450 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (No. CV 95-5958); Fourth Am. Compl. at paras.
24-31, Liu v. Donna Karan Int'l, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 4221 (WK), 2001 WL 8595 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2,
2001); Second Am. Compl. at paras. 51, 56, Qi Xian Wang v. Hua Great Procetech Inc., No. 98
CV 2786 (ILG) (RML) (E.D.N.Y. June 18, 1998).
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strategies include consumer boycotts, 164 voluntary codes of conduct, 165
DOL-monitored compliance agreements between manufacturers and
contractors, 166  and proposed state legislation that would hold
manufacturers liable for contracting with law-breaking factories. 167 In
164. LOUIE, supra note 1, at 226-28 (describing the anti-corporate campaign launched by the
Asian Immigrant Women's Advocates against clothing manufacturer Jessica McClintock); Marc
Cooper, No Sweat: Uniting Workers and Students, A New Movement is Born, NATION, June 7,
1999, at 11 (discussing the anti-sweatshop movement that has developed on college campuses),
available at 1999 WL 9307111; David Moberg, Bringing Down Niketown: Consumers Can Help,
NATION, June 7, 1999, at 15 (describing the strengths and weaknesses of public relations
campaigns, such as consumer boycotts and codes of conduct, as strategies to eradicate
sweatshops), available at 1999 WL 9307112. Consumer boycotts of apparel produced by sweat
labor are designed to galvanize morally responsible consumers to exercise the power of the purse
against manufacturers who make big profits while workers labor under oppressive conditions.
The boycotts are based on the notion that consumers are entitled to purchase clothing with the
confidence that they are produced in compliance with labor standards. See Gijsbert van Liemt,
Codes of International Subcontracting: A 'Private' Road Towards Ensuring Minimum Labor
Standards in Export Industries 8-10 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
(explaining why companies have adopted codes of conduct).
165. Consumers have exerted pressure on manufacturers to adopt voluntary codes of conduct
and monitoring systems for ensuring that the clothes they market and sell are made without sweat
labor. See Lance A. Compa & Tashia Hinchliffe Darricarrre, Private Labor Rights Enforcement
Through Corporate Codes of Conduct, in HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 181, 181 (Lance A. Compa & Stephen F. Diamond eds., 1996); Steven Greenhouse,
Groups Reach Agreement for Curtailing Sweatshops, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1998 at A5, available
at LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File; Alan Howard, Editorial, Partners in Sweat,
NATION, Dec. 28, 1998, at 24; van Liemt, supra note 164, at 10. See Foo, supra note 69, at
2194-95, for a discussion of why voluntary self-policing schemes based on manufacturers
monitoring their contractors are inherently flawed. Foo argues that "[a] system that relies on
manufacturers to police their subcontractors will not work for one simple reason: There is no
economic incentive for the manufacturers to do so." Id. at 2195. The policing schemes are
destined to fail because they are like the "fox guarding the chicken coop." Id.
166. In recognition of declining resources for investigations, the DOL, under Secretary Robert
Reich, sought to enlist the aid of manufacturers to monitor garment contractors for compliance
with labor laws. See Andrew Ross, supra note 22, at 28-29 (describing Reich's "No Sweat"
campaign as an "action-oriented strategy" to reinvigorate the authority of the DOL under the
FLSA's "Hot Goods" provision and to enjoin the interstate transport of goods produced in
violation of labor standards); Elmore, supra note 21, at 410-12, 426-27 (evaluating the DOL's
system of pressuring manufacturers into monitoring contractor compliance with labor standards);
Finder, supra note 37, at 7 (reporting Reich's explanation of the DOL's efforts to get
manufacturers to voluntarily agree to audit contractors for compliance with labor laws by
wielding the threat of the DOL's authority to halt the interstate shipment of clothing made in
violation of the FLSA).
167. See Elmore, supra note 21, at 415-19, for an analysis of California's recently enacted
Assembly Bill 633, which holds guarantors (those who contract with garment contractors) jointly
liable with contractors for wages owed to garment workers. See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 345-a
(McKinney 2002) for an example of a statute holding a manufacturer liable if he or she knew or
should have known of the contractor's failure to comply with minimum wage and hour laws. For
proposed state legislation in New York and New Jersey on the issue of joint liability for wage
debts of contractors, see Assemb. B. 6685, 224th Sess. (N.Y. 2001) (making any entity engaged
in the business of garment manufacturing liable to the same extent as those persons
it contracts to perform garment manufacturing operations); Assemb. B. 4730, 224th Sess. (N.Y.
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recent years, public interest law firms have also brought a spate of
lawsuits on behalf of garment workers using the FLSA's joint employer
doctrine. 168 These suits claim that manufacturers should be held liable
as joint employers for wages owed by contractors, even though they are
not the direct employers. 169  Advocates argue that joint liability is
warranted since manufacturers ultimately determine the wages and
conditions of garment workers through control of the production
process and economic domination of marginal contractors. 170
The joint employer doctrine under the FLSA is based on judicial
interpretations of the statutory and regulatory definitions of "employee,""employ," and "employer."' 17 1 The FLSA defines "employee" as "any
individual [who is] employed by an employer."' 172 The term "employ"
broadly includes "to suffer or permit to work," 173 and "employer"
2001) (penalizing persons transporting goods for, or to, unregistered apparel manufacturers and
contractors when they knew or should have known of the lack of registration); and Assemb. B.
1787 (N.J. 2000) (holding any entity, including a retailer, that contracts with a contractor for the
production of apparel jointly and severally liable for any wages or other state employment
benefits owed by the contractor).
168. See, e.g., Zheng v. Liberty Apparel, No. 99 CIV. 9033 (RCC). 2002 WL 398663, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2002): Lopez v. Silverman, 14 F. Supp. 2d 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1998): infra note
323 and accompanying text (discussing joint employer litigation relating to garment
manufacturers).
169. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing workers' claims that the
manufacturers were liable based on the joint employer doctrine); infra notes 287, 296 and
accompanying text (discussing farmers' status as joint employers).
170. See, e.g., Fourth Am. Compl. at paras. 24-31, Liu v. Donna Karan Int'l, Inc,, No. 00 Civ.
4221 (WK), 2001 WL 8595, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2001) (order denying motion to dismiss);
Second Am. Compl. at paras. 51, 56, Qi Xian Wang v. Hua Great Procetech Inc., No. 98 CV
2786 (ILG) (RML) (E.D.N.Y. June 18, 1998); Pl.'s Not. of Mot. & Mot. for Partial Summ. J. at
20-24, Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F. Supp. 1450 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (No. CV 95-5958).
171. See infra note 175 and accompanying text (noting cases where the courts have
interpreted the statutory and regulatory definitions under the FLSA).
172. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e) (2000 & West Supp. 2002).
173. Id. § 203(g); see also Goldstein et al., supra note 33, at 1015-55 (describing the "suffer
or penmit to work" standard under criminal and child labor statutes). The crux of the "suffer or
permit to work" standard was whether the business owner had the means of knowing of the work
and had the power to prevent the work. Goldstein et al., supra note 33, at 1047. It was not
necessary to show the owner's knowledge of a child's age because liability stemmed from
suffering or permitting the work itself, not the violation. Id. at 1137, 1048.
The authors argue that courts have mistakenly ignored the "suffer or permit to work" standard
that Congress incorporated into FLSA. Id. at 1106. They maintain that courts have wrongly
adopted the "economic realities" test, displacing the more liberal standard of "suffer or permit to
work." Id. at 1103-08. The authors explain that "[t]he economic-realities or economic-
dependence test improperly narrows the scope of the FLSA coverage because it uses many
common-law factors at odds with the expansive 'suffer or permit to work' definition." Id. at
1161. They suggest a revised judicial approach in which joint liability is imposed if an alleged
joint employer "suffers or permits all work performed in his business," and "[w]ork is
performed in a business if it is an integrated part of the process encompassed within the
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includes any person "acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an
employer in relation to an employee."' 174  The Supreme Court has
emphasized that courts should interpret broadly the definition of"employ" to include as "employees" those "who might not qualify as
such under a strict application of traditional agency law principles."'] 75
Further, the regulations promulgated under the FLSA expressly
recognize joint employment relationships. 176 They state that a worker"may stand in the relation of an employee" to more than one entity at
the same time. 177 If employment by one entity is not completely
disassociated from employment by another, then the two are joint
employers and are to be held individually and jointly responsible for
compliance with all applicable provisions of the FLSA. 178  When a
worker performs work that "simultaneously benefits two or more
employers," a finding of joint employment is appropriate "where one
employer is acting directly or indirectly in the interest of the other" or if
the two employers "share control of the employee, directly or
indirectly."']79
The FLSA and the implementing regulations are quite open-ended in
defining who is covered by the terms "employee," "employer," and
"joint employer."' 180  The Act and regulations do not offer specific
guidance on how these terms should be interpreted in the context of
subcontracted employment. Consequently, the responsibility for
delineating the boundaries of who is a joint employer has fallen upon
the courts. 18 1 Only a handful of cases address whether a garment
business." Id. at 1162; see infra notes 194, 257, 310 and accompanying text (explaining the
concept of integration).
174. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).
175. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992); see, e.g., Rutherford
Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 729 (1947) (quoting Walling v. Portland Terminal Co.,
330 U.S. 148, 150 (1947)) (The FLSA "'contains its own definitions, comprehensive enough to
require its application to many persons and working relationships which, prior to this Act, were
not deemed to fall within an employer-employee category."'); United States v. Rosenwasser, 323
U.S. 360, 362 (1945) ("A broader or more comprehensive coverage of employees within the
stated categories would be difficult to frame."); Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1393 (9th Cir.
1993) (citing Darden, 503 U.S. at 326).
176. Joint Employment Relationship Under Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 C.F.R.
§ 791.1 (2002).
177. Id. § 791.2(a).
178. Id.
179. Id. § 791.2(b).
180. See supra notes 172-79 and accompanying text (discussing the statutory and regulatory
definitions relevant to the joint employer doctrine).
181. MARC LINDER, THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 185-87 (1989) (stating that the task of defining the employment
relationship under numerous labor and employment statutes falls upon courts, which must
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manufacturer may be held liable as a joint employer under the FLSA.18 2
On the other hand, substantial legal precedent on the joint employer
liability of agricultural growers under the FLSA spans several decades
of litigation. 183  Other industries, such as home health care, poultry
processing, temporary employment, and prison labor, have been the
subjects of efforts by workers to use the joint employer doctrine to
enforce wage and hour standards. 184
articulate policy and draw boundaries in the face of many laws). There is currently neither a
uniform nor a single judicial definition of "joint employer" that governs across statutes; rather,
the definition of "joint employer" varies from statute to statute, based on the remedial purposes of
the particular statute. See Anthony P. Camevale et al., Contingent Workers and Employment
Law, in CONTINGENT WORK: AMERICAN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN TRANSITION 281, 281
(Kathleen Barker & Kathleen Christensen eds., 1998); Jennifer Middleton, Contingent Workers in
a Changing Economy: Endure, Adapt, or Organize?, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 557,
576-83 (1996). Some practitioners, scholars, advocates, and commentators have argued that
labor and employment laws should be reformed to contain uniform definitions of
"employee," "employer," and "joint employer." See DUNLOP COMM'N ON THE FUTURE
OF WORKER-MGMT. RELATIONS, FINAL REPORT 64-69 (1995), available at
http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/ibrary/e-archive/gov-reports/dunlop/DunlopFinalReport.pdf (last
visited Feb. 25, 2003).
182. See infra note 323 and accompanying text (discussing the few cases that have addressed
the use of subcontracting systems in garment sweatshops). See generally infra Part IV
(discussing the principal case applying the joint employer doctrine to garment manufacturers,
Lopez v. Silverman, 14 F. Supp. 2d 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)).
183. For a review of cases brought by farm workers against agricultural producers based on
the joint employer doctrine under the FLSA and the Migrant and Seasonal Worker Protection Act
of 1983 ("MSPA"), see Michael H. LeRoy, Farm Labor Contractors and Agricultural Producers
as Joint Employers Under the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act: An
Empirical Policy Analysis, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 175 (1998). Congress enacted the
MSPA to increase the liability of agricultural producers for the actions of farm labor contractors
who employ migrant workers. Id. at 187. The MSPA and its regulations adopt the definitions of
"employ," "employer," and "employee" as set forth in the FLSA. 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(1)-(3)
(2002). Further, the MSPA regulations on joint employment incorporate the principles applicable
under FLSA regulations. Id. § 500.20(h)(4).
184. The proliferation of subcontracting practices and the expanded use of independent
contractors leave many workers vulnerable, as employing entities and contractors attempt to
disclaim liability for wage violations. See, e.g., Baystate Alternative Staffing v. Herman, 163
F.3d 668 (lst Cir. 1998) (holding that the temporary agency, along with client companies, were
the joint employers of temporary workers hired to perform unskilled labor, such as industrial and
factory work, heavy labor, and assembly and packing); Brock v. Superior Care, Inc., 840 F.2d
1054 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that nurses hired by a health care referral agency were employees,
not independent contractors); Donovan v. DialAmerica Mktg., Inc., 757 F.2d 1376 (3d Cir. 1985)
(concluding home researchers were employees of a telemarketing company for purposes of the
FLSA); Carter v. Dutchess Cmty. Coll., 735 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that a prison inmate
was not foreclosed from being considered an employee for purposes of federal minimum wage
provisions); Heath v. Perdue Farms, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 2d 452 (D. Md. 2000) (holding that Perdue
poultry operation was the employer of both crew leaders and chicken catchers based on an
economic reality analysis in an action for unpaid overtime wages); Preston v. Settle Down
Enters., 90 F. Supp. 2d 1267 (N.D. Ga. 2000) (holding that workers were employees of both the
temporary agency and consultant hired by the agency); Castillo v. Case Farms, 96 F. Supp. 2d
578 (W.D. Tex. 1999) (holding that a chicken processor and a farm labor contractor were joint
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The Supreme Court and numerous lower courts have heralded
economic reality as the touchstone in determining the existence of an
employment relationship or joint employer status. 185  Under the"economic realities" 186 test, whether an employer-employee
relationship is found depends upon the economic realities of a work
relationship, rather than narrow and technical classifications of
employee and employer.187  This test consists of a multi-factor
balancing analysis that is based on the totality of the circumstances in
which no single factor is dispositive. 188 Furthermore, courts trumpet
employers in an action by migrant farm workers for FLSA violations). In addition, workers have
used the economic realities test to enforce minimum wage standards against local, state, and
federal governments. See Barfield v. Madison County, 212 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that
county board members in their individual capacity do not need to indemnify the county after it
settled with its employees in an action for unpaid overtime wages); Baker v. Stone County, 41 F.
Supp. 2d 965 (W.D. Mo. 1999) (holding that members of the county commission and the county
sheriff were joint employers in an action for unpaid overtime); Janda v. City of Omaha, 580
N.W.2d 123 (Neb. 1998) (holding that the City of Omaha and parties using city facilities were
joint employers of a public events engineer in an action for unpaid overtime wages under the
FLSA).
185. Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961) (adopting the reasoning
that economic reality, rather than technical concepts, is the proper test of employment); NLRB v.
Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 129 (1944) (finding that coverage under the National Labor
Relations Act ("NLRA") "is to be determined broadly, in doubtful situations, by underlying
economic facts rather than technically and exclusively by previously established legal
classifications"); Torres-Lopez v. May, Ill F.3d 633, 639 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Bonnette v.
Cal. Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1982)) ("A court should consider
all those factors which are 'relevant to [the] particular situation' in evaluating the 'economic
reality' of an alleged joint employment relationship under the FLSA."); Aimable v. Long & Scott
Farms, 20 F.3d 434, 439 (11 th Cir. 1994) (explaining that whether an employment relationship
exists depends not on common law definitions, but on the economic reality of all the
circumstances); Sec'y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1534 (7th Cir. 1987) (In defining the
limits of coverage under the FLSA, "[w]e are seeking, instead, to determine 'economic reality."');
Castillo v. Givens, 704 F.2d 181, 190 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting Weisel v. Sing Joint Venture, 602
F.2d 1185, 1189 (5th Cir. 1979)) ("'[T]he touchstone of economic reality in analyzing a possible
employee/employer relationship for purposes of the FLSA is dependency."').
186. See infra note 194 (describing the tensions between the common law control test and
economic realities test in Anglo-American tort law); infra notes 238-60 and accompanying text
(discussing the origins of the economic realities test and New Deal cases). The argument that
courts should apply the more generous "suffer or permit to work" standard in lieu of the
economic realities test is gaining currency among scholars and practitioners. See generally
Goldstein et al., supra note 33, at 1008-15 (positing that courts have mistakenly adopted the
economic realities approach).
187. Hearst Publ'ns, 322 U.S. at 129.
188. For the earliest cases enunciating the premise that the economic realities test is a highly
fact-specific inquiry that rests on all the circumstances, see Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126,
130 (1947) ("It is the total situation that controls."); Rutherford Food Corp. v. McCombs, 331
U.S. 722, 730 (1947) ("[The determination of the [employment] relationship does not depend
on ... isolated factors but rather upon the circumstances of the whole activity ...."); United
States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 716 (1947) (ruling that "[n]o one [factor] is controlling nor is the list
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economic dependency as the touchstone of the economic realities
test. 189 Whether a worker is dependent upon the business to which he
or she renders service is the paramount inquiry. 190
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, perhaps, provides the clearest
explication of this relationship in Usery v. Pilgrim Equipment Co.191
According to the court, balancing factors are "tools to be used to gauge
the degree of dependence of alleged employees on the business with
which they are connected." 192 Further, "no one of these considerations
can become the determinant, nor can the collective answers to all of the
inquiries produce a resolution which submerges the consideration of the
dominant factor-economic dependence."'] 93
Two competing versions of the economic realities test emerge from
contemporary FLSA cases, mirroring the tensions at work in early
Anglo-American tort law for distinguishing between employees and
independent contractors. 194 In one line of cases, courts adopted a set of
complete" in explaining the factors used to determine whether an employment relationship exists
for purposes of the Social Security Act).
189. See Brock v. Mr. W Fireworks, Inc., 814 F.2d 1042, 1043 (5th Cir. 1987) (explaining
that the multifactor economic realities test must be directed at "an assessment of the 'economic
dependence' of the putative employees, the touchstone for this totality of the circumstances test").
190. See Barrels, 332 U.S. at 130 ("[ln the application of social legislation employees are
those who as a matter of economic reality are dependent upon the business to which they render
service."). For cases citing to the reasoning in Bartels, see, for example, Howard v. Malcolm,
852 F.2d 101, 106 (4th Cir. 1998); Donovan v. Sureway Cleaners, 656 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir.
1981); Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., 603 F.2d 748, 754 (9th Cir. 1979).
191. Usery v. Pilgrim Equip. Co., 527 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1976); see also Sec'y of Labor v.
Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1538 (7th Cir. 1987) ("Economic dependence is more than just another
factor. It is instead the focus of all the other considerations.").
192. Pilgrim Equip. Co., 527 F.2d at 1311.
193. Id. ("[l]t is dependence that indicates employee status. Each test must be applied with
that ultimate notion in mind."). In addressing whether two or more entities could be the joint
employers of a worker, the question "is not whether the worker is more economically dependent
on [one entity or another], with the winner avoiding responsibility as an employer." Antenor v. D
& S Farms, 88 F.3d 925, 932 (11 th Cir. 1996). Rather, "'[t]he focus of each inquiry ... must be
on each employment relationship as it exists between the worker and the party asserted to be a
joint employer."' Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 97-885, at 7-8 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4553-54).
194. The definitions of employee, independent contractor, and joint employer under modem
labor and employment statutory law are rooted in the common law agency principles used in tort
law to distinguish between employees and independent contractors for the purpose of determining
vicarious liability. See LINDER, supra note 181, at 134, 201-02. Employers are held vicariously
liable to third parties for torts committed by employees but not for those committed by
independent contractors. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 335-36 (2000).
It is often presumed that there was a single test in Anglo-American tort law for making the
employee-independent contractor distinction. LINDER, supra note 181, at 133. However, courts
developed two main lines of precedent. Id. at 134-35. One line rested on the alleged employer's
physical control over the worker. Id. at 134. The other line rested on ascertaining "economic
realities." Id. at 15, 134. To this end, the relative skill and expertise of the worker and alleged
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four factors that approximates the restrictive common law control
test.195 These factors plainly favor a finding against joint employment
or employee status. 196 Under the second line of cases, courts used the
more liberal multi-factor approach that emphasizes economic realities
over physical control of the worker. 197 However, the court in Lopez v.
Silverman criticized this set of factors as being "equally skewed in the
opposite direction" from the common law control test.198 The two
versions of the economic realities test, like their counterparts in early
employer, and whether the worker's activity could be integrated into the alleged employer's
business became crucial inquiries. Id. at 134, 141, 200-01. Integration referred to whether a
business possessed the skills and expertise to supervise the work of another such that it could
incorporate that work as part of its regular business. See id. at 141; Goldstein et al., supra note
33, at 1143--44. "Where the worker possessed a skill that the employer did not possess and could
not integrate into his business," the courts treated the worker as an independent contractor rather
than an employee. LINDER, supra note 181, at 134; see infra notes 239-58 and accompanying
text (discussing the role of integration in the landmark New Deal cases that established the
economic realities test under labor and employment statutes).
195. Under this approach, courts typically inquire into whether the alleged employer (1) had
the power to hire and fire employees; (2) supervised and controlled employee work schedules or
conditions of employment; (3) determined the rate and method of payment; and (4) maintained
employment records. For cases employing these four factors or close variations, see Hernan v.
RSR Security Services, Ltd., 172 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1999); Alternative Staffing, Inc. v.
Herman, 163 F.3d 668, 675 (1st Cir. 1998); Carter v. Dutchess Community College, 735 F.2d 8,
12 (2d Cir. 1984); Bonnette v. California Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th
Cir. 1983); Preston v. Settle Down Enterprises, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1274 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
While these factors are perceived as the "indicia of traditional free-market employment
relationships," they concentrate on the most readily ascertainable employer prerogatives, such as
specific control over the daily physical performance and conditions of work. See Henthorn v.
Dep't of Navy, 29 F.3d 682, 686 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (discussing the propriety of the four factor test
for determining whether prison-laborers are covered employees under the FLSA).
196. See Lopez v. Silverman, 14 F. Supp. 2d 405, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (stating that the four-
factor test is "obviously skewed" and would "rarely permit a finding of joint employer status
outside of situations involving direct corporate subsidiaries or managing administrators").
197. Factors frequently used to assess economic realities include: (1) the degree of the alleged
employer's right to control the manner in which the work is performed; (2) the alleged
employee's opportunity for profit or loss; (3) the alleged employee's investment in equipment or
materials; (4) whether the service rendered requires a special skill or initiative; (5) the degree of
permanency or exclusivity of the work relationship; and (6) whether the service rendered is an
integral part of the alleged employer's business. For cases utilizing this set of factors, see Dole v.
Snell, 875 F.2d 802 (10th Cir. 1989); Brock v. Superior Care, Inc., 840 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1988);
Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529 (7th Cir. 1987); Brock v. Mr. W Fireworks, Inc.,
814 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir. 1987); Donovan v. DialAmerica Marketing, Inc., 757 F.2d 1376 (3d Cir.
1985); Donovan v. Sureway Cleaners, 656 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1981); Real v. Driscoll Strawberry
Associates, 603 F.2d 748 (9th Cir. 1979); and Usery v. Pilgrim Equipment Co., 527 F.2d- 1308
(5th Cir. 1976).
198. The court explained that "because those factors test principally for employment status in
the first instance, as opposed to independence, they will almost always yield the same result for
the putative second employer as for the acknowledged first employer, and thus are not sufficiently
discriminating for purposes of the joint employment inquiry." Lopez, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 415.
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tort law, represent and reproduce divergent concepts about what it
means to be an employee and employer.
B. Aimable v. Long & Scott Farms: Limitations of the Control and
Contract Theories of Employment
The common law control test of the employment relation was
premised on the paradigm of a classic master-servant relationship.
199
The hallmark of this relationship was the master's direct physical
domination and control over the servant's performance of his or her
work.200 Therefore, the narrow issue of physical control became the
exclusive inquiry under this approach.2° 1  Aimable v. Long & Scott
Farms °2  is a contemporary case that exemplifies the inherent
limitations of the common law control theory for discerning joint
employment in subcontracting arrangements, especially when the
control theory is conjoined with contract law. The issue in Aimable was
whether a farm that contracted with a farm labor contractor to provide
migrant laborers to pick its crops was a joint employer of the laborers
under the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act
2°3
("MSPA") and the FLSA.2 0 4 The court rejected the migrant laborers'
contention that they were economically dependent on the farm. 20 5 The
farm paid the farm labor contractor a flat rate for each quantity of crop
harvested, used no other farm labor contractors, and was the farm labor
contractor's largest single source of income. 206 In turn, the farm laborcontractor recruited the laborers, provided them with housing and
199. See LINDER, supra note 181, at 136-38. See generally DOUGLAS E. RAY ET AL.,
UNDERSTANDING LABOR LAW 3-5 (Matthew Bender & Co. ed., 1999), for a description of
master-servant relations in the United States during the eighteenth century. In this paradigm, the
master's household was the center of economic life. RAY ET AL., supra, at 3-5. Not only did the
master own the workplace and the tools and materials of production, but also the workers often
lived and worked in the master's household. Id. Consequently, the authority and command
wielded by the master was clear, direct, and unattenuated. Id.; see also JAMES B. ATLESON,
VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 13 (1983) ("The household provided the
model, and the master had inherent power to prescribe for his family, as well as for his
servants.").
200. See LINDER, supra note 181, at 143 ("[R]eal substantive control by the employer of the
employee is the defining operative characteristic of the core type of capital-labor
relationship .... ").
201. Id. at 134.
202. Aimable v. Long & Scott Farms, 20 F.3d 434 (11 th Cir. 1994).
203. Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1872
(2000).
204. Aimable, 20 F.3d at 436.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 437.
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transportation, and paid them on a piece rate basis. 20 7 Although the
farm did not control hiring and firing, the laborers maintained that the
farm effectively controlled their labor because it made all of the major
agricultural decisions that "necessarily determined the amount of
produce that could be harvested and, therefore, the exact amount of
work available."20 8
According to the court, the control identified by the laborers
implicated abstract notions of control, and the proper focus should be
limited to specific indicators of control over direct employment
decisions, such as the numbers of workers to hire and the assignment of
specific tasks to workers. 20 9  Since the farm had no hand in these
decisions, its effect on the laborers' employment was viewed as "neither
direct nor substantial," even though the farm controlled all
consequential planting decisions.2 1° The court gave no justification for
restricting the concept of control and excluded consideration of facts
that evidenced control over the structure and organization of the
farming enterprise.
The laborers' attempt to advance a less formalistic definition of the
factors of supervision and control over wages met a similar fate before
the court. 2 11 Clearly, the farm labor contractor, not the farm, exercised
direct supervision over the workers' daily physical performance of work
and established the wages of the workers. The laborers, however,
argued that the farm retained supervisory power over them since it
oversaw each day's production and certain post-picking tasks.2 12
Further, they claimed that the farm indirectly controlled their pay rate
because the farm determined the pay rate of the farm labor contractor,
who refused to pay them more money unless he received more money
from the farm. 213
The court rejected the laborers' arguments about supervision,
stressing the importance of facts that demonstrate direct and continuous
oversight or intervention with workers.2 14 More importantly, the court
207. Id.; see also supra notes 56-57 and accompanying test (describing the piece rate system).
208. Aimable, 20 F.3d at 440. The laborers alleged that the farm decided "which crops to
plant, how much to plant, and how to grow the crop." Id. Additionally, the farm determined
which fields were to be harvested and how frequently. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 441.
211. Id. at 441-42.
212. Id.
213. Id. at442.
214. Id. at 441; see also Alviso v. Medrano, 868 F. Supp. 1367, 1372 (M.D. Fla. 1994)
(holding that the farm did not exercise direct or substantial control over the workers since there
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derided the claim that the farm indirectly controlled the laborers' rate of
pay through its domination of major planting decisions and
determination of the price paid to the farm labor contractor.215 The
court criticized this argument as following "the transitive property of
geometry," and stated, "[u]nfortunately for appellants, the laws that
bind the Euclidian [sic] world do not apply with equal force in federal
employment law." 2 16  In the court's view, the farm labor contractor
bargained at arm's length for the terms of compensation and was wholly
free to determine the laborers' wages based on the revenue he earned
from the farm.2 17
The court in Aimable conjoined master-servant law and contract law
to reproduce formalistic definitions of employer and employee. 2 18  Its
insistence on strict control and supervision comported with the master-
servant model, in which the master wielded direct and tangible physical
domination over the performance of workers who were part of his
household. 219 However, this formalism fails to account for the complex
ways in which work in a modem economy has been reconfigured by
subcontracting practices. 220  Specifically, an emphasis on narrow
control and direct physical supervision is inapt where a work
arrangement is based on multiple layers of relationships that are
designed to attenuate the employment relationship. 22 1  Moreover, the
court's exclusive use of contract law to address wage issues
individualized the work relationships at stake and extracted them from
was "no evidence that [it] gave specific instructions to the workers, assigned specific tasks, or
took an overly active role in supervising the work").
215. Aimable, 20 F.3d at 441-42.
216. Id. at 442.
217. Id.
218. See ATLESON, supra note 199, at 14-15 (arguing that the melding of master servant law
and contract law in the nineteenth century was used to perpetuate the subordination of labor to
capital in a modern market economy). Atleson maintains that master-servant law defined the
contours of the employment contract, and the "mythological nature" of the freely bargained
exchange in an employment contract had always been recognized. Id. at 1- 15.
219. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text (discussing the master-servant
paradigm).
220. See infra notes 318-19 and accompanying text (discussing the use of subcontracting and
other "non-dependent" work structures as a means of diluting the employment relationship to
disclaim liability under labor and employment statutory laws).
221. See United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 712 (1947) (explaining that restrictive definitions
of the employment relationship threaten to "invite adroit schemes by some employers and
employees to avoid" responsibilities); Middleton, supra note 181, at 582-83 (noting the use of
subcontracting to maintain distance from the operations of the subcontractor to avoid incurring
liability even where the client firm is aware of violations committed by the subcontractor); see
also infra notes 318-19 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of an unclear definition of
"economic dependence").
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their institutional context. This was shown most notably in the court's
unwillingness to acknowledge that the major economic variables of the
employment relationship between the laborers and the farm labor
contractor were in any way shaped by the decisions of the farm.222 The
interpretation of the relationship between the laborers and the farm
labor contractor, and between the farm labor contractor and the farm, as
a series of discrete arms-length bargained exchanges, exhibited a failure
to "recognize problems of capital structure, and indeed, power itself., 223
Consequently, the application of classic contract notions concealed the
possible economic subordination of the farm labor contractor and the
laborers to the farm.
Relatedly, viewing each work relationship as a discrete contractual
transaction led the court to accord greater weight to some balancing
factors over others without due consideration of the operational
characteristics of the agricultural industry. The court held that the"regulatory factors" listed under MSPA regulations 224 merited greater
import than the "non-regulatory factors" 225 from various legal decisions
222. See Charles v. Burton, 169 F.3d 1322, 1330-31 (11 th Cir. 1999) (relying on Aimable in
rejecting migrant workers' argument that a farm operator shared responsibility with a farm labor
contractor for determining wages because it controlled the amount of seeds planted and fields
harvested, and determined the compensation of the farm labor contractor, who controlled the pay
rates of the workers).
223. James B. Atleson, Reflections on Labor, Power, and Society, 44 MD. L. REV. 841, 842
(1985). James Atleson posits that "[tihe 'law talk' in cases increasingly assumes that labor has
arrived as, if not an equal, at least a substantial equalizer to capital." Id. at 841-42. He further
argues that "[li]egal discussions of economic weapons and alleged 'balancing of interests' tend not
to focus upon changes in corporate or capital structure. These matters, largely ignored by both
legal writers as well as legal decisionmakers, tend to be left to professionals in other fields." Id.
at 842.
224. The MSPA regulations at the time identified the following five "regulatory factors" as
useful guidance for determining whether a joint employment relationship existed: (A) nature and
degree of control of the workers; (B) degree of direct or indirect supervision; (C) power to
determine pay rates and method of payment; (D) right to hire, fire, or modify the terms or
conditions of employment of workers; and (E) preparation of payroll and payment of wages. 29
C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(4)(ii) (1992), amended by 62 Fed. Reg. 11734 (Mar. 12, 1997). The DOL
amended the regulations in 1997 to emphasize a broader interpretation of joint employer status
than captured by these five factors. See infra notes 230, 232 and accompanying text (discussing
DOL amendments to the MSPA that clarified and expanded the framework for determining joint
employment in the agricultural industry).
225. In addition to the regulatory factors, laborers identified the following as relevant to the
issue of joint employment: the degree of the workers' investment in equipment and facilities; the
opportunity of the workers for profit and loss, the permanency and exclusivity of employment;
the degree of skill required for the work; ownership of the facilities or property where work was
performed; and the integral nature of the work performed to the business. Aimable v. Long &
Scott Farms, 20 F.3d 434, 439 (1lth Cir. 1994). These factors were not contained in the
regulations-thus, referred to as "non-regulatory factors"-but were based on case law. Id.
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identified by the migrant laborers. 226 The regulatory factors resembled
the common law control test, while the non-regulatory factors
approximated the economic realities approach. The court downplayed
the relevance of non-regulatory factors, such as the relative investment
in equipment and facilities, the workers' opportunity for profit and loss,
the permanency and exclusivity of the employment, and the degree of
skill needed by the workers.227 The court also held that the two non-
regulatory factors, ownership of facilities and whether the job
performed was integral to the business, favored a finding of joint
employment. 228 Nevertheless, it concluded that these factors deserved
little weight in comparison to the regulatory factors.229
The way in which relations and production in the agricultural
industry are structured, organized, and patterned did not figure
explicitly into the decision about which factors would most enable the
court to assess the economic dependence of the migrant laborers.
Aimable has drawn sharp criticism230 for failing to accord sufficient
226. See id. at 445 (noting that the district court's determination that only five regulatory
factors were relevant to the case was largely correct).
227. Id. at 443-44. While conceding that these factors showed that the farm laborers were
economically dependent, the Eleventh Circuit summarily dismissed the factors because, in its
view, they did not indicate upon whom the laborers were dependent. Id. For a criticism of this
conclusion, see Torres-Lopez v. May, Ill F.3d 633, 641 (9th Cir. 1997) ("[T]he Aimable court
ignored a fundamental principle behind the joint employment doctrine: that a worker may be
employed by more than one entity at the same time .... The issue is not whether a farmworker is
more dependent upon the farm labor contractor or the grower.") (citations omitted).
228. Aimable, 20 F.3d at 445.
229. Id.
230. See Torres-Lopez, IIl F.3d at 641 (explaining "Aimable is not persuasive authority,
however, because it misconstrued the importance of the non-regulatory factors" and in excluding
the factor of investment in equipment and facilities, "the Aimable court ignored a fundamental
principle behind the joint employment doctrine"). For other cases recognizing the importance
and relevance of non-regulatory factors in the farm worker context, see, for example, Charles v.
Burton, 169 F.3d 1322, 1331-34 (1lth Cir. 1999) (finding non-regulatory factors rejected by
Aimable to be probative of migrant farm workers' dependency and noting the DOL's criticism of
Aimable); Antenor v. D & S Farms, 88 F.3d 925, 937 (1 lth Cir. 1996) (distinguishing Aimable
when holding that the relative degree of investment in equipment and facilities by the
independent contractor and the alleged employer was probative of the worker's economic
dependence). The DOL amended the MSPA regulations in 1997 to clarify and broaden the
framework for determining joint employment in the agricultural industry. See MSPA, 62 Fed.
Reg. 11,734 (Mar. 12, 1997) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(5)(ii)) (stating that the purpose of
the proposed rule was to "assist in focusing on and applying the flexible multifactor analysis").
The amended regulations expanded the list of factors to include those rejected as insignificant by
the court in Aimable. See MSPA, 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(5)(iv)(A)-(G) (2002). The DOL cited to
Aimable as an example in which the courts had inappropriately treated the five regulazory factors
as exclusive and exhaustive. MSPA, 62 Fed. Reg. 11,734 (March 12, 1997) (codified at 29
C.F.R. § 500). The DOL also criticized Aimable and other recent court decisions for applying the
regulations "as a checklist, or as a rigid formula ... with little analysis beyond a comparison of
the totals at the bottom of the columns 'for' and 'against' joint employment." Id.
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weight to the non-regulatory factors in an industry where it is
commonplace for agricultural growers to engage labor contractors to
hire workers in order to "create a buffer" that shields them from liability
for mistreatment of workers. 231 In proposing amendments to the MSPA
regulations that define joint employment, the DOL referred to certain
structural and operational characteristics of the agricultural industry
when explaining why the factors downplayed in Aimable have a
significant bearing on the issue of economic dependency. 232 The DOL
was, in essence, providing an interpretive framework for the multi-
factor analysis that was based on the specific structures and patterns of
agricultural subcontracting practices. There are growers and contractors
of different sizes and resources, with numerous variations in the details
of how relationships and arrangements between workers, contractors,
and growers are structured. 233 Yet, the court in Ainable neither touched
upon these patterns, nor whether the variations in these patterns are
consequential to the issue of economic dependency. Such an analysis
would have placed the parties in a broader institutional context, thereby
shedding reasoned light on which factors merited greater weight.234
This conceptual gap in Aimable can be discerned in much of the case
law on joint employment, including those cases finding in favor of
231. Castillo v. Case Farms of Ohio, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 2d 578, 589 (W.D. Tex. 1999).
232. The DOL explained that whether the work was unskilled was a relevant factor because
"[i]n common experience in the agricultural industry and other contexts, there is a reasonable
correlation between the worker's degree of skill and the marketability and value of his/her
services." MSPA, 62 Fed. Reg. at 11,740. Marketability, in turn, is correlated with economic
dependency. Id. at 11,741. The DOL also explained why the integral nature of the work
performed is a relevant consideration. "In the agricultural industry ... there is a logical and
appropriate correlation between the 'centrality' of a function in a business operation and the
certainty of the business' performance of that function through the use of whatever resources or
methods are necessary, including the use of labor." id. Consequently, workers who perform an
integral task are dependent upon the grower's overall production process. Id. But see LeRoy,
supra note 183, at 204 (criticizing the DOL's rule as "a mechanistic approach for making
agricultural employers strictly liable for the conduct of [farm labor contractors]").
233. LeRoy, supra note 183, at 204-05 ("[A]gricultural employment relationships are highly
varied, depending on the size of the operation, amount of work, the proximity of an owner to a
production process, and the type of crop involved."). LeRoy argues that the heterogeneity of
work arrangements and relationships shows why courts should be given freedom in deciding
which factors to apply. Id. at 205-06. While it is true that work relationships can be structured in
myriad forms, broader conceptual and interpretive frameworks are needed to contextualize
specific facts. Otherwise, with so many possible factual variations, courts are left without
guidance for distinguishing between consequential and inconsequential variations.
234. Instead, the court proffered no real explanation, relying on the flexibility of the totality of
the circumstances as justification. Aimable, 20 F.3d at 439 ("[W]e look .. . to the 'economic
reality' of all the circumstances concerning whether the putative employee is economically
dependent upon the alleged employer."); see also id. at 444 ("We believe, however, that our
inquiry permissibly may be limited to probative factors .... [N]ot all factors are relevant in every
case.").
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workers. Courts decide rather arbitrarily which factors to employ and,
without articulated interpretative frameworks to guide their decisions,
courts oscillate between different versions of the factors, resulting in
inconsistencies within circuits.235 There are few efforts to identify the
wider institutional patterns or typology of work relationships found in
an industry. The heterogeneity of individual facts is usually not situated
in a broader institutional context that takes the economic and power
structure of the industry into account. The emphasis on individual and
particular factors, consistent with a contract framework, obscures the
importance of the industry's operational characteristics to an
understanding of the position of individual actors. Consequently, the
open-endedness of the totality of the circumstances approach can lead to
an unfocused examination that revolves around superfluous detail, yet
lacks purposeful precision. 236 This fault has led to the criticism that the
235. See Bonnette v. Cal. Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1983)
(offering no explanation why hiring and firing, direct supervision and control, determination of
the rate and method of employment, and maintenance of employment records were the
appropriate factors for assessing joint employment in an action against welfare agencies and
counties for back wages by workers who provided services to disabled public assistance
recipients); see also supra notes 307-09 and accompanying text (discussing criticism by legal
scholars of labor law jurisprudence and discussing some of the cases). The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals neither acknowledged nor reconciled the more liberal balancing factors that it used in
recently decided cases such as Donovan v. Sureway Cleaners, 656 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1981), and
Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Associates, 603 F.2d 748 (9th Cir. 1979). In Donovan and Real, the
court used the following factors to analyze potential joint employment: control over the
performance of work, the alleged employee's opportunity for profit or loss, the alleged
employee's investment in equipment or materials, the degree of specialized skill required for the
work, the permanency of the relationship, and the degree of integration into the alleged
employer's business. In Donovan and Real, there was no discussion of the stricter balancing
factors. See Donovan, 656 F.2d at 1371-72; Real, 603 F.2d at 754. The court did not explain
why the factors it selected were the most sensible based on the structure and organization of the
industries involved.
Cases in the Second Circuit also oscillate between control factors and economic reality factors.
In Carter v. Dutchess Community College, the court, quoting Bonnette v. California Health &
Welfare Agency, adopted the narrow four-factor test to determine whether a prison inmate was
entitled to receive minimum wages from a community college as a joint employer. Carter v.
Dutchess Cmty. Coll., 735 F.2d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting Bonnette, 704 F.2d at 1470). Later,
in Brock v. Superior Care, Inc., 840 F.2d 1054, 1058-60 (2d Cir. 1988), the court utilized the
more liberal balancing factors to hold that nurses hired by a health care agency were employees,
not independent contractors. While acknowledging that Carter considered different factors, the
court did not distinguish Carter or otherwise explain why the more expansive factors were
justified. Brock, 840 F.2d at 1059. As in the Ninth Circuit cases, the decision about which
factors to apply in Carter and Superior Care was not informed by consideration of how the
employment industry involved was structured and where the litigants fit within those structures.
236. LINDER, supra note 181, at 234. Linder criticizes the economic realities test as both
technical and amorphous because it analyzes superfluous detail, which invites manipulation by
employers. Id. at 234-35. Moreover, he argues that the test, as currently formulated, is ill-
equipped to address what "dependency" means and why it should be the lynchpin in determining
whether an employment relationship exists. Id.
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economic realities test is indeterminate, unpredictable, and highly
susceptible to manipulation by both employers and judges. 21 Critics
liken litigation of joint employer cases to "legal Russian roulette." 238
Perhaps more importantly, the lack of conceptual rigor required of
courts in applying the multi-factor analysis impedes a coherent judicial
understanding of how power relations are manifested in industry-
specific subcontracting arrangements.
C. True Economic Realities: Realigning the Concept of Control
The more liberal version239 of the current economic realities test
possesses the potential to pierce the formalistic definitions of
employment that master-servant and contract law propagate. This
version of the economic realities test resembles the economic realities
approach that was born under tort law in repudiation of the common law
control test. 24  The recognition that the world of work "encompass[ed]
a heterogeneous mass of work and employment relationships in which
classical.., control at the point of performance [was] less tangible"
gave rise to the economic realities test.241 Under the economic realities
test, economic subordination of the worker to the purported employer
was the prime inquiry. 242 Although the control test eventually eclipsed
the economic realities test in tort law,243 the Supreme Court, in a series
of cases in the 1940s, imported the economic realities test as the basis
for formulating definitions of "employee" and "employer" under New
237. See Sec'y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1539 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.,
concurring) (criticizing the multi-factor balancing approach as "unsatisfactory both because it
offers little guidance for future cases and because [the] balancing test begs questions about which
aspects of 'economic reality' matter, and why"); Richard R. Carlson, Variations on a Theme of
Employment: Labor Law Regulation of Alternative Worker Relations, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 661,
667-71 (1996) (positing the need for a single federal common law test of employee status to
avoid the lack of uniformity or predictability arising from the multi-factor analysis of the
economic realities test under various labor and employment statutes); Middleton, supra note 181,
at 577-78, 582 (summarizing the need to reform definitions of the employment relationship in
order to address a wider range of abuses faced by the growing contingent of a part-time and
temporary labor force).
238. See, e.g., Middleton, supra note 181, at 582 n. 112 (quoting Jonathan G. Axelrod, Who's
the Boss? Employee Leasing and the Joint Employee Relationship, 3 LAB. LAW. 853, 866
(1987)).
239. See supra note 197 and accompanying text (discussing factors designed to assess
economic realities rather than physical control).
240. LINDER, supra note 181, at 15.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 134.
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Deal labor and employment statutes. 244 The result was a greater safety
net for workers because the definition of "employee" was expanded to
embrace those who were not subject to direct physical domination, and
the definition of "employer" was broadened to include those who had
no direct contractual employment relationship with a group of workers.
NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.245 was the first to enunciate an
economic realities approach in a statutory labor context. The Court
noted that the common law control test was problematic for the
numerous work relationships that fell outside of what was clearly an
employer-employee or independent contractor relationship. 246
Consequently, the Court concluded that coverage under the National
Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") should be determined "by underlying
economic facts rather than technically and exclusively by previously
established legal classifications. ' 24 7
248In United States v. Silk, the Court established the modern
economic realities test as a multi-factor analysis. 249 It identified factors,
such as the workers' opportunities for profit or loss, investment in the
facilities, permanence of relation, skill of the workers, and degree of
control over the workers, as useful in drawing the employee-
independent contractor distinction. 25  Although the test required
consideration of an employer's physical control, the remaining factors
encompassed broader aspects of a worker's economic subordination.
In Bartels v. Birmingham,25 1 the Court not only reaffirmed the multi-
factor analysis used in Silk, but also gave the concept of dependence a
244. Id. at 142; see Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126 (1947); Rutherford Food Corp. v.
McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (1947); United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947); NLRB v. Hearst
Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
245. NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
246. Id. at 125-26. The Court observed that "[mlyriad forms of service relationship, with
infinite and subtle variations in the terms of employment, blanket the nation's economy." Id. at
126.
247. Id. at 129 (citations omitted). According to the Court, in seeking to equalize the
inequality of bargaining power that could lead to industrial strife, Congress understood that some
disputes might involve employees who have an economic relationship with "employers," but who
were not their employers based on the common law control test. Id. at 128-29. When Congress
enacted the NLRA, it "had in mind a wider field than the narrow technical legal relation of,master and servant,' as the common law had worked this out in all its variations." Id. at 124.
248. United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947).
249. Id. at 713-19.
250. Id. at 716. The Court also cautioned that "no one [factor] is controlling nor is the list
complete." id.
251. Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126 (1947).
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central role in the analysis of a worker's economic reality. 25 2  By
positing dependency as a core concept counterpoint to control, the Court
made it possible to consider how power and subordination could be
expressed in an employment relationship in a way other than by control
over how work is performed.
Expanding the ranks of protected employees also necessitated
liberalizing the definition of "employer." Rutherford Food Corp. v.
McComb253 "plainly arose in the context of an ostensible joint
employment relationship."254  In the case, the Wage and Hour
Administrator of the Department of Labor brought an action against
Rutherford Food Corporation for allegedly violating the FLSA by not
paying employees overtime and by not keeping proper records. 25 5
Because the meat boners in Rutherford Food Corp. were clearly
employees, and not independent contractors, the question was whether
they were the employees of a slaughterhouse operator where they were
hired and compensated by an experienced meat boner who contracted
with the slaughterhouse operator to assemble, supervise, and
compensate meat boners to perform work at the slaughterhouse. 2 56 At
the heart of Rutherford Food Corp. was whether the slaughterhouse
operator was a joint employer in the absence of a direct contractual
relationship with the meat boners.257
252. Id. at 130-31. The Court explained, "Obviously control is characteristically associated
with the employer-employee relationship, but in the application of social legislation employees
are those who as a matter of economic reality are dependent upon the business to which they
render service." Id. at 130.
253. Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (1947).
254. Lopez v. Silverman, 14 F. Supp. 2d 405, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). Rutherford Food Corp.
was described by the District court in Lopez v. Silverman as the Supreme Court's "leading joint
employment case." Id. 415. Lopez is the leading case on whether apparel manufacturers may be
held liable as joint employers for the violations of the FLSA committed by contractors. See infra
Part IV (discussing Lopez).
255. Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 723.
256. Id. at 724-25.
257. Id. at 728-30. Under the contract, the supervising meat boner was paid based on the
volume of work performed, and he possessed complete control over the other meat boners, who
were deemed to be his employees. Id. at 724-25. Furthermore, the boning supervisor determined
the method and basis of compensation. Id. at 725-26. Though the boners supplied their own
tools, which were minimal, they performed all of their work at the slaughterhouse, alongside
slaughterhouse employees. Id. The task of boning was only one part in a series of interdependent
steps in which cattle were slaughtered and the meat was skinned, dressed, boned, trimmed,
weighed, and transported to market. Id. While the slaughterhouse did not control the hours
worked, the president and manager made site visits several times each day to check the meat
boners' performance. Id. at 726.
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As in Silk and Bartels, the Court used a multi-factor approach and
found that the meat boners were employees of the slaughterhouse. 258
The Court, however, applied a different cluster of factors that pushed
the concept of economic dependency in new directions. Most
significantly, the Court introduced the factor of integration into the
calculus-including whether the workers performed a specialty job on
the production line that was an integral part of the putative employer's
overall system of production. 259 The Court's conclusion that the meat
boners were employees rested on its agreement with the court of appeals
that each meat boner worked toward the accomplishment of a common
objective, and their work was part of "'an integrated economic unit."' 260
The Court considered several additional factors, 26 1 two of which
capture another critical dimension of economic dependency. If the
contracts between the contractor and putative employer pass without
material changes between successive groups of workers, and the
workers are unable to shift as a business unit from one putative joint
employer to another, the employment arrangement implicates the issue
of who dominates the contract. 262 These factors trigger an assessment
of whether a contractor has a genuine opportunity to bargain with the
putative employer over the workers' labor.26 3  Alternatively, the
question is whether the contracts are really "form arrangements
permitting little negotiation, such that essentially any economically
dependent group of workers could be brought in to replace a prior group
performing identical work. -
These landmark New Deal cases, in effect, renounced master-servant
law and contract law as the principal measures of the employment
relation. Following this lead, some contemporary courts have been
258. Id. at 730-31.
259. Id. at 729. Integration is one of the most useful indicia of economic dependency,
requiring an inquiry into how the purported employer's operations are structured and organized
and an understanding of how the work performed by a worker fits within that process. See supra
notes 173-94 and accompanying text (discussing the role of integration in the "economic
realities" and "suffer or permit to work" standards).
260. Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 726 (quoting Walling v. Rutherford Food Corp., 156
F.2d 513, 516 (10th Cir. 1946)).
261. These factors were as follows: (I) whether the terms of the boning contracts passed
without material changes from one group of boners to another: (2) whether the premises and
facilities of the slaughterhouse operator were used; (3) whether the boners had a business
organization that enabled them to shift from one plant to another; (4) whether the slaughterhouse
officials closely managed the operation: and (5) whether the boners' success depended more on
efficiency than initiative, judgment, or foresight. Id. at 730.
262. Id.
263. Lopez v. Silverman, 14 F. Supp. 2d 405, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
264. Id.
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receptive to efforts by workers to re-align the definitions of "control"
and "supervision" in accordance with the patterns of authority and
subordination that characterize subcontracted work arrangements. For
example, in occupational industries that preclude direct supervision,
there is a need to discern power less formalistically. In Donovan v.
DialAmerica Marketing, Inc.,265 the court clearly perceived the limited
utility of specific control and supervision in assessing the employment
relation when workers perform home work. The court found the facts
showing that an alleged employer retained only a small degree of
control over how home researchers performed their job to be largely
insignificant. 266 Noting the particularity of the industry structure, the
court explained that the nature of home work generally allowed
researchers to choose the times they worked and were subject to
minimal direct supervision. 267
Similarly, in Baystate Alternative Staffing, Inc. v. Herman,268 the
court recognized that the absence of direct on-the-job supervision by a
temporary employment agency did not preclude a finding that the
agency was a joint employer.269  While the client company was
responsible for all on-site supervision, the court propounded a broader
view of supervision, noting that the temporary agency "exercised
indirect supervisory oversight of the workers through its
communications with client companies regarding unsatisfactory
performance. '" 270
A few courts have gone further to unmoor the definitions of"employer" and "employee" from the limiting concepts of specific
control and contract law by identifying which parties in a
subcontracting arrangement possess real "'economic substance' behind
[their] power. ' 271 Where a purported employer has some direct and
265. Donovan v. DialAmerica Mktg., Inc., 757 F.2d 1376 (3d Cir. 1985).
266. Id. at 1384.
267. Id. at 1380, 1386.
268. Baystate Alternative Staffing, Inc. v. Herman, 163 F.3d 668 (1st Cir. 1998).
269. Id. at 676.
270. Id. In addition, the court held that there were other important indicia of the temporary
agency's "control over the nature and structure of the relationship with the temporary workers,"
such as screening and hiring workers, refusing to send a worker back to a client company,
assignment of workers to job sites, and instructing workers about appropriate attire. Id. at 675-
76; see also Torres-Lopez v. May, 111 F.3d 633, 642-43 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the
agricultural grower exercised a significant degree of supervision of farm workers when it
maintained communications with the farm labor contractor, who directly oversaw the workers,
retained the right to inspect work before and after it was completed, and had a presence in the
fields).
271. Castillo v. Givens, 704 F.2d 181, 192 (5th Cir. 1983). Although the court in Castillo did
not reach the question of joint employer status, its reasoning supports the notion that where a
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tangible role, along with the contractor, in determining wages or the
method of pay, or in ensuring compliance with tax laws, courts have
had no trouble in finding joint employer status.272  There is uniform
treatment under these circumstances because specific indicia of control
over some aspect of the workers' compensation exist.273  The issue
becomes murkier without evidence that an alleged employer actually
dictates the wages or payment of taxes, or wields direct influence over
the contractor's purse strings or financial operations. In these cases,
there is a need for a more "systemic" or "institutional" concept of
economic power and subordination, perhaps one that focuses more on
the hierarchy of power than on the expression of power. Businesses that
outsource work to one or several contractors will enter these
relationships through arms-length bargaining. They deliberately
attenuate the employment relationship by not assuming any formal
contractor or other labor intermediary is involved, the economic realities of workers hired by the
contractor rest on assessing the relationship between the intermediary and the contracting firm.
See id. at 191 (stating that employer status for the independent contractor indicates employer
status for the workers). In determining whether the laborers were employees of the farm, the
court concentrated on assessing whether the intermediary who hired laborers to perform work for
a farm was in business for himself or was an employee of the firm. Id. at 19 1.
272. See Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs. Ltd., 172 F.3d 132, 140-41 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding of
joint employer status, despite the lack of direct control over workers, supported by evidence that
appellant could have unilaterally dissolved the company); Antenor v. D & S Farms, 88 F.3d 925,
936 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that a farm labor contractor did not solely and independently
establish wages and benefits of workers where farm growers deducted money to pay social
security taxes and purchased workers' compensation insurance); Bonnette v. Cal. Health &
Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1983) (supporting joint employer status with
control of the purse strings by state and county agencies through determining grant amounts to
recipients as a significant factor); Hodgson v. Griffin & Brand, Inc., 471 F.2d 235, 238 (5th Cir.
1973) ("The fact that appellant set the rate of pay of the harvest workers, decided whether crew
leaders would pay a piece rate or an hourly rate in a given instance, and handled the social
security contributions for the harvest workers also tend to indicate an employment relationship.");
Baker v. Stone County, 41 F. Supp. 2d 965, 982 (W.D. Mo. 1999) (holding that the county
commission was a joint employer, in addition to the county sheriff, because of the commission's
"budgetary authority and ability to virtually 'shut down' the Sheriff's Department"); Barfield v.
Madison County, 984 F. Supp. 491, 498 (S.D. Miss. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 212 F.3d 269
(5th Cir. 2000) (finding that a county was a joint employer, even though it lacked power to hire
and fire, because it allocated funds to the sheriff's department and possessed "the ultimate
authority for approving the necessary funds for paying any overtime"); Alviso-Medrano v.
Harloff, 868 F. Supp. 1367, 1373 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (concluding that the facts weighed in favor of
joint employer status where the farm determined whether payment would be based on an hourly
rate or a piece rate and indirectly insured that the piece rate paid by crew leaders did not fall
below the minimum wage).
273. Even according to the court in Aimable, this treatment would not have been problematic
because this kind of control over the intermediary's purse strings constitutes specific rather than
abstract control. See Aimable v. Long & Scott Farms, 20 F.3d 434, 442 (11 th Cir. 1994).
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expression of power or influence over how the contractor establishes the
wages and conditions of production or service workers. 274
The analysis in numerous cases illustrates the need for reconstituting
the concept of economic control to pierce the power dynamics in
subcontracted employment. In Real v. Driscoll Strawberry
Associates275 and Torres-Lopez v. May,276 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals considered wage issues outside of classic notions of freedom of
contract. It declined to view the various sets of economic relationships
in a subcontracting arrangement as products of distinct and independent
arms-length bargaining.277  Rather, the court recognized that the
economic subordination of the contractor to the engaging firm could
substantially impinge upon the economic relationship between the
contractor and its workers. 278
In Real, the issue was whether a group of strawberry growers were
the employees of both the contractor who hired them and the farm
company that granted a license to the contractor to grow its patented
varieties of strawberries. 279 The strawberry growers were paid a rate
that the contractor, Driscoll, alone determined. 280 The court reasoned,
however, "Particularly significantly, it appears that DSA [the farm
company] may ultimately determine the amount the appellants are paid
for their labor."281  The court made this conclusion because DSA
unilaterally determined the remuneration paid to Driscoll for each crate
of strawberries that it delivered to DSA.282  Similarly, the court in
Torres-Lopez found that a farm exercised some power over the pay rates
of cucumber farm workers through its determination of the amount of
compensation paid to the labor contractor. 28 3 The court noted that the
farm had increased the labor contractor's compensation to make it
possible for the farm workers to be paid higher wages, 284 leading the
274. See generally infra notes 318-20 and accompanying text (discussing employer distancing
practices for avoiding claims of economic dependency).
275. Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., 603 F.2d 748 (9th Cir. 1979).
276. Torres-Lopez v. May, Il1 F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 1997).
277. See id. at 650 (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that there was "little negotiation"
between the contractor and the engaging form); Real, 603 F.2d at 755 (emphasizing that
"[e]conomic realities, not contractual labels, determine employment status for the remedial
purposes of the FLSA").
278. Torres-Lopez, Ill F.3d at 642-43; Real, 603 F.2d at 755-56.
279. Real, 603 F.2d at 750.
280. Id. at 751.
281. Id. at 756.
282. Id.
283. Torres-Lopez, Ill F.3d at 638, 643.
284. Id.
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court to conclude that the farm workers were economically dependent
upon the farm as their joint employer.285
The Fifth Circuit in Castillo v. Givens286 was also receptive to the
notion that the economic domination of a labor intermediary by the
engaging firm might be so substantial as to impair the intermediary's
ability to comply with minimum wage laws. 287 Givens, a farm owner,
hired an intermediary, Tonche, purportedly as an independent contractor
to furnish field workers for chopping cotton. 288  Tonche, who was
compensated by Givens, in turn, paid the fieldworkers. 289  The court
found that "[t]he economic reality of the situation was that the workers
were dependent upon defendant [Givens]-not Tonche-to pay them
the minimum wage." 290  Since Tonche was not paid enough by Givens
to enable him to pay the workers minimum wage, Tonche could not
comply with the FLSA. 29 1
In addition to the issue of who determines wages, the issue of who
dominates the form and structure of the contract can also be a critical
inquiry for assessing the economic dependence of the contractor's
workers on the engaging company. In Real, the court looked at who
285. See id. at 644. Judge Aldisert's dissent rejected this line of reasoning, instead adopting a
formalistic contract view of the economic relationships involved. Id. at 645-50 (Aldisert, J.,
dissenting). Judge Aldisert stressed that while the farm increased the labor contractor's
compensation so that the farm workers might be paid more during the early part of the harvest,
"[tihere [was] no evidence . . . that [the farm] required [the labor contractor] to pay at any
particular rate." Id. at 647 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). The farm labor contractor "had the sole
power to determine the pay rates and the methods of payment for the workers," and "was free to
pay its workers whatever rate it might choose." Id. (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
286. Castillo v. Givens, 704 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1983).
287. See supra note 271 and accompanying text (discussing the Fifth Circuit's reasoning that
laborers' economic realities depend upon the relationship between the contractor and the
engaging firm). As discussed at note 271, supra, the court in Castillo did not reach the issue of
whether the farm was the joint employer of the field workers because it found that the labor
intermediary was an employee and not an independent contractor. Therefore, those hired by the
intermediary were also the farm's employees. Nonetheless, the court's reasoning in Castillo is
useful for developing the concept of a "dependent contractor" as one who has little economic
"ability to bargain effectively over core topics without the client providing reimbursement or
additional compensation." Larry Engelstein, Labor Law for Contract Employees: A Modest
Reform Agenda, in 48 CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN LABOR EMPLOYMENT LAW 319, 338 (Bruno
Stein ed., 1996); see infra notes 394-405 and accompanying text (describing dependent
contractors as those who are entrepreneurs in form but are so economically subservient to the
engaging firm that they are unable to negotiate meaningfully); see also Barrientos v. Taylor, 917
F. Supp. 375, 382-83 (E.D.N.C. 1996) (holding that the farm essentially dictated wages of farm
laborers since the farm labor contractor's dependence on the influx of cash from the farm
"allowed him no discretion i[n] setting the pay rates for plaintiffs").
288. Castillo, 704 F.2d at 184.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 192.
291. Id.
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actually "determine[d] the form of the working relationship" between
the strawberry growers and the contractor, notwithstanding that
compensation was in the sole discretion of the contractor. 29 2 The court
held that the district court erred in ruling as a matter of law that the
strawberry growers were not the employees of the farm company. 293 It
relied, in part, on facts showing that the farm dictated the contract form
to be used by the contractor in subcontracting work to the strawberry
growers; further, the contractor was not free to alter the contract form
without approval from the company. 294 Thus, the court found that the
company controlled the structure of the relationship between the
contractor and strawberry growers, even though the company exercised
no direct influence over wages and work conditions.295
A contractor's lack of meaningful ability to negotiate with the
engaging firm has also been found to be probative of whether the
engaging firm is a joint employer of a contractor's employees. This
arrangement exists where the subordination of the contractor to the
engaging firm during negotiations results in a standardized contract for
the industry29 6 or one in which there are "no material changes" 297
among successive contractors. In distinguishing between employees
and independent contractors, the unilateral imposition of contractual
terms by the principal 298 has been a factor in revealing who "exercises
292. Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., 603 F.2d 748. 756 (9th Cir. 1979).
293. Id. at 750.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 756.
296. See Torres-Lopez v. May, Ill F.3d 633, 643 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the lack of
material changes in the terms of the contracts between a farm and farm labor contractors was a
factor indicating that the farm was a joint employer of farm workers hired by a contractor because
"[t]he contracts were standard for the industry and involved little negotiation").
297. See supra notes 261-64 and accompanying text (noting that courts will consider whether
contracts pass between workers without change to determine the employment relationship).
298. See Donovan v. Sureway Cleaners, 656 F.2d 1368, 1371 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding that a
dry cleaner "unilaterally impose[d] the terms of the contracts" of agents hired as independent
contractors, resulting in all of the agents operating under the same contract despite possessing, "in
theory, the power to set prices [and] determine their own hours"); Usery v. Pilgrim Equip. Co.,
527 F.2d 1308, 1312 (5th Cir. 1976) (finding that "the only negotiated item is the percentage of
income the operator would retain, an item which is usually unilaterally imposed at the outset" by
client companies). The unilateral imposition of key contractual terms was closely related to the
question of who controlled decision making over the meaningful aspects of a business. In
Donovan, the court held that the dry cleaner "rather than its 'agents,' exercise[d] control over the
meaningful aspects of the cleaning business" because it, among other things, furnished supplies,
handled advertising, and selected the location of the retail outlets. Donovan, 656 F.2d at 1371.
Similarly, the court in Pilgrim Equipment Co. held that the operators of the laundry pick-up
stations were employees, not independent contractors, under the FLSA because "[t]he major
determinants of the amount of profit which an operator could make," were directly determined by
the laundry companies. Pilgrim Equip. Co., 527 F.2d at 1313.
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control over the meaningful aspects" of a business. 299  As previously
discussed, the court in Aimable flatly rejected inquiry into who controls
the consequential decisions in a business operation, 300 viewing this kind
of institutional control as abstract and irrelevant.30 1 But, in Real and
Torres-Lopez, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that
determining who dominates decision making over the "essential
determinants of profits in a business" 30 2 is a useful gauge of the degree
to which the employment conditions of a contractor's workers are
ultimately determined by the engaging firm, albeit indirectly. 30 3  In
Real, the Ninth Circuit found that facts suggesting that a farm
controlled, though indirectly, important decisions about growing
strawberries, including decisions regarding fertilizer and insect control,
were probative of joint employer status. 3° 4 The court added that the
economic dependence of strawberry growers on a farm could also be
inferred from the farm's control of the quantity and variety of
strawberries to be grown and its capacity to market the strawberries. 30 5
299. Donovan, 656 F.2d at 1371. In distinguishing between employees and independent
contractors, the question of who exercises control over the meaningful aspects of a business is
aimed at discerning whether the purported independent contractor truly "'stands as a separate
economic entity."' Id. (quoting Pilgrim Equip. Co., 527 F.2d at 1313). In joint employer claims,
who exerts meaningful control over important aspects of the business is relevant to whether the
contractor is so subordinated to the firm that its employees are also dependent on the firm. See
supra notes 284-85 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of finding an independent
contractor as an "employer").
300. Aimable v. Long & Scott Farms, 20 F.3d 434, 439-40 (11 th Cir. 1994).
301. See supra notes 209-14 and accompanying text (explaining the court's decision that the
proper focus should be limited to specific indicators of control over direct employment
decisions).
302. Dole v. Snell, 875 F.2d 802, 809-10 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding that cake decorators were
employees, not independent contractors, under FLSA because they had no control over "the
things upon which the volume of cakes [sold] depended, such as the number of retail outlets, and
the quality and attractiveness of their decor, the selection and efficiency of the counter help,
advertising for the business, [and] the quality of the ingredients in the cakes"); Sec'y of Labor v.
Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1536 (7th Cir. 1987) (reasoning that a pickle farm's "pervasive overall
control" over the "entire pickle-fanning operation" was probative of the farm workers' economic
dependence on the farm); see also supra note 278 and accompanying text (discussing how the
economic subordination of the contractor to the farm affects workers).
303. Torres-Lopez v. May, IIl F.3d 633, 644 (9th Cir. 1997); Real v. Driscoll Strawberry
Assocs., 603 F.2d 748, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1979).
304. Real, 603 F.2d at 756.
305. Id. Consistent with Real, the Ninth Circuit held, in Torres-Lopez, that a farm's control
over major agricultural decisions was another factor favoring a finding that it was the joint
employer of farm workers who were hired and supervised by a labor contractor. Torres-Lopez,
Ill F.3d at 642-43. These decisions included determining the overall harvest schedule and
planting dates. Id. at 642.
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 34
D. Broader Lessons About the Promise of the Joint Employer Doctrine
It is apparent from this examination of cases that the joint employer
doctrine can be used to plug some of the legal loopholes that result in
numerous workers being deprived of their rightful wages. Yet, the use
of the doctrine is more than just a legal strategy about who possesses the
deepest pockets in an industry. By challenging contract law as the main
source of rights and responsibilities for workers and employers,30 6 the
joint employer doctrine offers the promise of piercing the veil of a
subcontracting system that shifts responsibility for wages and
conditions onto marginal contractors. The employment relationship, as
one based on the freedom to contract, has long been the dominant
paradigm in American jurisprudence for defining rights in the
workplace.30 7  This paradigm exalts the themes and imagery of liberty
of contract, individualism, and the "free market." 30 8  The entrenched
belief that parties should be left free to privately order economic
306. Craig Becker, Labor Law Outside the Employment Relation, 74 TEX. L. REv. 1527, 1537
(1996) ("In contemporary labor and employment law privity of contract between employer and
employee is the basis of both statutory and contractual obligations. Virtually without exception,
federal and state regulations locate duties toward employees in their direct employer.").
307. A number of legal scholars have criticized constitutional and labor law jurisprudence for
espousing a paradigm of individualism, liberty of contract, and equality of power that is at odds
with the reality of most workers. See, e.g., ATLESON, supra note 199, at 178-79 (1983) (arguing
that "[t]he notion of contract stresses the voluntary exchange of freely bargained promises,
appealing to values of individualism, while simultaneously completely ignoring" the asymmetry
of the employment relationship); Fran Ansley, Standing Rusty and Rolling Empty: Law, Poverty,
and America's Eroding Industrial Base, 81 GEO. L.J. 1757, 1788-89 (1993) ("Many of the
fundamental assumptions and images embedded in cases like Lochner are now showing
themselves to be particularly potent in an arena where capital has overshadowed national
sovereignty and 'free trade' is seen by many as the ticket to a golden future."); Craig Becker,
Democracy in the Workplace: Union Representation Elections and Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN.
L. REV. 495, 603 (1993) (concluding that as "long as the law construes employers and unions as
equals in union elections, industrial democracy will remain as much a legal fiction as liberty of
contract"); James J. Brudney, A Famous Victory: Collective Bargaining Protections and the
Statutory Aging Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 939, 947 (1996) (questioning the wisdom of appellate
court decisions under the NLRA that reinvigorate the "paradigm of individual rights" by
protecting individual employee choice at the expense of stable collective bargaining
relationships); Michael H. Gottesman, In Despair, Starting Over: Imagining a Labor Law for
Unorganized Workers, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59, 69-71 (1993) (explaining that in most cases the
employment contract is one in which the employer unilaterally fixes the terms and the
employment relation is, "on a day-to-day basis, one of domination and subordination"). But see
Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor
Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357 (1983) (arguing that current labor law regime is a mistake
because well-developed common law principles of torts and contracts can be used to adequately
govern employer-employee relations).
308. See Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 460-61 (1909) ("[O]ur ideal
of justice has been to let every force play freely and exert itself completely, limited only by the
necessity of avoiding friction. As a result, and as a result of our legal history, we exaggerate the
importance of property and contract .... ").
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relationships contributes to a judicial reluctance to intercede on behalf
of workers and alter the inequalities that are produced by the "free
market." 30 9  In this vein, the New Deal cases signaled an important
moment for advancing the rights of workers.
Hearst, Silk, Bartels, and Rutherford Food Corp. extricated an
analysis of the rights of workers and duties of employers from the
strictures of contract law.3 10 By interposing alternative themes into the
calculus of who was an employee and employer, these cases expanded
the vocabulary for evaluating the content of employment relationships.
Phrases such as "economic realities," "underlying economic facts," and"economic dependency," especially when taken together, suggested
associations with power and inequality in economic relationships. The
incorporation of issues such as integration, and of inequality of
bargaining power in the later cases, permitted a consideration of the
structure of production and control of the enterprise that would
otherwise have been excluded by the formalism of master-servant and
contract law. Thus, the introduction of a multi-factor analysis 3 11
309. See, e.g., NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 288 (1972) (arguing that"saddling" a new employer with the collective bargaining contract of a predecessor employer,
even where a majority of the new employer's workforce was comprised of employees who were
covered by the old contract and performed the same work at the same site, would "discourage and
inhibit the transfer of capital," where the NLRA was intended "to allow the balance of bargaining
advantage to be set by economic power realities"); Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S.
148, 154-57 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring) (arguing that the proper ground for holding that
railroad trainees were not employees under FLSA rested on judicial deference to the "customs
and contracts of an industry" and criticizing a more interventionist approach); Vizcaino v.
Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1006, 1011-12 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that, while Microsoft had
misclassified workers as independent contractors, the court was bound to address the validity of
the contract, which rendered independent contractors ineligible for benefits, in determining
whether the workers were entitled to pension benefits).
310. Prior to these cases, state courts had invoked the doctrine of liberty of contract routinely
to invalidate legislation that guaranteed workers minimum standards on wages, hours, health and
safety conditions, and the right to collective action. Pound, supra note 308, at 470-82 (reviewing
state and federal cases striking down protective labor legislation based on liberty of contract).
The Supreme Court constitutionalized the inviolability of liberty of contract in several decisions
in the early 1900s. See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (finding that state law that
criminalized conditioning employment on not being in a labor organization as violative of due
process); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (holding unconstitutional a federal law
making it a crime for interstate carriers to discharge an employee from service due to labor
organization membership); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating state or
federal protections of workers as an impermissible infringement of the right to contract).
311. Under a multi-factor approach, courts typically consider such factors as (1) the degree of
the alleged employer's right to control the manner in which the work is performed; (2) the alleged
employee's opportunity for profit or loss; (3) the alleged employee's investment in equipment or
materials; (4) whether the service rendered requires a special skill or initiative; (5) the degree of
permanency or exclusivity of the work relationship; and (6) whether the service rendered is an
integral part of the alleged employer's business. See supra notes 249-305 and accompanying text
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diminished the view of contract as the exclusive source of rights by
providing an alternative ground for finding that a worker fell within
protective coverage.
Yet, the contract paradigm of employment continues to enjoy great
vitality despite widespread acknowledgement that most low-wage
workers do not truly bargain for their employment. As critic Karl E.
Klare states, "many of the most significant aspects of the employment
relation are determined neither by market forces, nor by law, but by
planning internal to the firm."312 Other critics argue that the
individualistic and contractual models of employment have less to do
with strict application of common law principles of contract than with
notions about political, social, and economic order.3 13  Tempering the
force of the contract paradigm requires greater clarity about what
economic dependency means in contemporary employment
relationships. Specifically, economic dependency must focus squarely
on issues of economic subordination and subservience. Without
frameworks for understanding inequality and hierarchy that are
industry-specific, judicial line drawing about applicable factors,
probative facts, and definitions of factors become mechanical and less
useful.3 14 While courts tout economic dependency as the touchstone of
the economic realities test, there is surprisingly scarce discussion of
what this means. 3 15  It is as though economic dependency is imbued
(discussing the application of the multi-factor approach by various courts). These factors are
similar to those used in Silk. See United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 716 (1947).
312. Karl E. Klare, Workplace Democracy and Market Reconstruction: An Agenda for Legal
Reform, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 15 (1988).
313. The notion of free labor in a free market, even at its inception, was belied by the fact that
much of America's labor force in the eighteenth century was bound and without freedom.
Further, this labor force was highly regulated by the state. See RAY ET AL., supra note 199, at 3,
and ATLESON, supra note 199, at 87-89, for a discussion of slaves and other workers who were
considered to be bound laborers. Atleson theorizes that the American view of the employment
relationship may have been deeply influenced by assumptions about status and obligations that
flowed from a system of bound labor. ATLESON, supra note 199, at 88.
Similarly, Pound maintained that the force of the doctrine of liberty of contract in labor and
employment had it sources and causes outside of contract law. Pound, supra note 308, at 459-62.
He argued that the appeal to reason against authority and assigned status in the eighteenth century
gave rise to doctrines of civil liberty and natural rights of the individual. Id. The strong emphasis
on individualist conceptions of justice resulted in a jurisprudence that exaggerated the importance
of property and contract, and elevated private rights above public interest. Id.
314. See LINDER, supra note 181, at 236 (arguing that it was the "built-in ambiguity [of the
economic realities test] that not only made possible but virtually preordained the subsequent
express hollowing out of the economic reality of dependence test, which deprives it of all internal
consistency and distinct significance").
315. The economic realities test first became explicitly linked to the concept of economic
dependency in Bartels. See supra note 244 and accompanying text (discussing the definitions of
employer-employee under New Deal statutes). Since then, the concept of economic realities has
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with certain natural or inherent meanings that are so obvious that they
do not need articulation. Judges treat the concept mainly without
reference to changing patterns in corporate or capital structure that
affect how relationships between workers, contractors, and client
companies are patterned. In this way, economic dependency is treated
as if it exists outside of a historical and industry-specific context. The
most that courts have explained of economic dependence is that "it
examines whether... workers are dependent on a particular business or
organization for their continued employment," 3 16 and it is intended to"protect those whose livelihood is dependent upon finding employment
in the business of others." 317
This definition ill equips judges and other legal decision makers to
understand the power dynamics of current work arrangements.
Working for a single employer at a fixed location for a long period of
time under a direct employment relationship is an anachronism for
many workers. 318  In today's labor market, employers seek to
institutionalize "non-dependency." The growing use of subcontracted
employment and independent contractors, as well as leased, part-time,
and temporary employees, across diverse occupational sectors is
designed to create a workforce that expects instability, insecurity,
intermittency, and peripherality. 319 Employers distance themselves
been explained by reference to the multi-factor analysis of the economic realities test. Though
the factors shed light on economic dependency, there has been no conceptual explication beyond
this proposition.
316. Donovan v. DialAmerica Mktg., Inc., 757 F.2d 1376, 1385-86 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding
that home researchers were economically dependent upon a telemarketing company when they
worked on a continuous basis and could not offer their services to others); see also Halferty v.
Pulse Drug Co., 821 F.2d 261, 268 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating that economic dependence is not
measured by reliance on an alleged employer for one's primary source of income but on
dependence on a business for continued employment).
317. Fahs v. Tree-Gold Co-op Growers of Fla., Inc., 166 F.2d 40, 44 (5th Cir. 1948). The
court further explained that the inquiry into economic dependency "is directed toward those who
themselves are least able in good times to make provisions for their needs when old age and
unemployment may cut off their earnings." Id.; see also Castillo v. Givens, 704 F.2d 181, 189
(5th Cir. 1983) (discussing the relationship of a worker's dependency on a particular business and
its effect on that worker's employee-independent contractor status).
318. Becker, supra note 306, at 1561. This is in sharp contrast to the model of employment
that arose after World War II and prevailed through the 1970s. That model was predicated on a
social contract between employers and workers in which guarantees of security, permanency, and
exclusivity were mutually important to employers and workers. CAPPELLI ET AL., supra note
157, at 15-24. While many workers, particularly immigrant workers, were left out of this social
contract, this model of employment has dominated the legal and social culture of how work is
viewed. See id. 57-63 (detailing the transformation of the employment relationship as a result of
corporate restructuring designed to achieve greater flexibility and global competitiveness).
319. There is substantial literature documenting the transformation of the employment
relationship in the last decade through the widespread practice of subcontracting and other
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structurally and spatially from workers through "non-dependent" work
structures for the purpose of defeating claims of economic
320 tdependency. The strategic de-linking of employment from features
that have been so closely associated with economic dependency-
contractual privity, specific control, permanency, and exclusivity-
necessitates a rethinking of the concept.
Central to this task is the explicit repositioning of an analysis of
dependency on power inequality, hierarchy, and subordination. This
change is likely to encounter resistance because there is deep
ambivalence within the law to viewing labor and employment relations
as the product of anything other than individualism, liberty of contract,
and the free market. 32 1  Aimable reflected an adherence to this
paradigm. Torres-Lopez, Real, and Castillo, however, point in a
positive direction for aligning the concept of dependency with the
realities of current subcontracting practices. Though none of these
cases referred expressly to capital control and structure, or directly used
the terms "subordination" and "subservience," these cases exemplify
openness to looking beyond the fiction of liberty of contract.
contingent work arrangements. Commentators use the phrase "casualization of labor" to refer to
the phenomenon of increasing numbers of workers who can no longer expect security, long-term
advancement, training, stability, or predictability from their jobs. See, e.g., CONTINGENT WORK:
AMERICAN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN TRANSITION (Kathleen Barker & Kathleen Christensen
eds., 1998) (studying the legal and social implications of increasingly complex contingent
relationships used to supplant direct employment relationships between employers and workers)
[hereinafter CONTINGENT WORK]; SASKIA SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY (1991) (describing the
increase in casual and informal employment through the use of immigrant and part-time or
temporary workers, and the attendant deteriorating work conditions); Ansley, supra note 307, at
1769-70 (noting that the proportion of workers who have a "core" relationship to their employer
has declined while the number of part-time, temporary, and leased employees and independent
workers is on the rise); Becker, supra note 306, at 1553-61 (analyzing the legal conundrum of
workers who have been "peripheralized" through the use of subcontracting, and exploring new
frameworks for enforcing accountability for labor standards where there is no direct employment
relationship); Carlson, supra note 237, at 661 (summarizing the uncertain employment law status
of workers in alternative work relationships): Jonathan P. Hiatt, Policy Issues Concerning the
Contingent Workforce, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 739, 745-52 (1995) (arguing for law reform
measures to protect contract, leased, and temporary employees, including a revised definition of
joint employer to impose joint and several liability on contractors and their client firms);
Middleton, supra note 181, at 613-20 (arguing for the need for new forms of organization and
collective action to address the employment problems faced by an increasingly disposable
contingent workforce).
320. See, e.g., James B. Rebitzer, Job Safety and Contract Workers in the Petrochemical
Industry, in CONTINGENT WORK, supra note 319, at 243, 247-50, 259 (explaining that general
contractors in the petrochemical industry use subcontractors as intermediaries and deliberately
decline to provide training on health or safety measures to avoid incurring liability as employers
under OSHA, Workers' Compensation, or tort law).
321. See supra notes 306-17 and accompanying text (discussing the dominant paradigm for
defining rights in the workplace).
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IV. POSSIBILITIES AND PITFALLS OF AN ILLUSTRATIVE CASE IN THE
GARMENT INDUSTRY: LOPEZ V. SILVERMAN
The doctrine of joint employer, as it pertains to garment
manufacturers, is in an incipient stage. This is curious given the long-
standing history of garment sweatshops based on the subcontracting
system. Lopez v. Silverman,322 from the Southern District of New
York, is the principal case, and there are only a few other decisions on
the issue. 323  Like Real, Torres-Lopez, and Castillo, Lopez is a crucial
example of how the joint employer inquiry can be made to focus on
who wields real power and control in garment subcontracting practices
through an analysis of integration and economic domination of
contractors and garment workers by manufacturers. At the same time,
the court's discussion of close ties between the manufacturer and
contractor should not be used to invigorate the restrictive common law
control test or its progeny. A requirement of exclusive, regular, or
permanent manufacturer-contractor ties would deprive those garment
workers who are the most exploited in the industry of protection.
322. Lopez v. Silverman, 14 F. Supp. 2d 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
323. Most recently, in Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., the Southern District of New York
reverted to a constricted and formalistic definition of garment manufacturer joint liability. Zheng
v. Liberty Apparel Co., No. 99 CIV. 9033 (RCC), 2002 WL 398663 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2002).
The court granted the defendant manufacturers' motion for summary judgment, applying the
restrictive Carter test instead of the Lopez multi-factor analysis. Id. at *6-7. The court found
that the Carter test was controlling because it had been adopted by the Second Circuit in Herman
v. RSR Security Sen,ices Ltd., 172 F.3d 132, 140 (2d Cir. 1999), although that case concerned the
security guard industry, not the garment industry. Zheng, 2002 WL 398663 at *6. Zheng and
RSR neither distinguished Superior Care, a Second Circuit case that had adopted the more liberal
balancing factors, nor considered the operational characteristics of the industries to determine
which factors were the most appropriate for assessing economic dependency in those industries.
See supra notes 233-36 and accompanying text (discussing the arbitrariness of courts in selecting
factors). The remaining decisions on manufacturer joint liability have occurred in the context of
motions to dismiss. In Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F. Supp. 1450 (C.D. Cal. 1996), the first to
address the issue, Thai immigrant workers claimed that various contractors and manufacturers
were liable as joint employers for work conditions amounting to involuntary servitude. The court
held that the workers had sufficiently alleged a joint employment relationship for purposes of a
motion to dismiss. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text (discussing the lawsuit filed by
seventy-one Thai immigrants who had been subjected to involuntary servitude in California).
The other cases, rendered after Lopez, contain only a limited discussion, if any, of which factors
of the economic realities test are appropriate to apply. See Bravo v. Eastpoint Int'l, Inc., No. 99
Civ. 9474 (WK), 2001 WL 314622, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2001) (granting motion to dismiss
because garment workers had not alleged sufficient facts to establish that any defendant other
than Donna Karan possessed control over the workers); Liu v. Donna Karan Int'l, Inc., No. 00
Civ. 4221 (WK), 2001 WL 8595, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2. 2001) (relying on factors from Lopez,
instead of Carter and RSR, in denying a motion to dismiss); Lai v. Eastpoint Int'l. Inc., No. 99
CIV. 2095 (DLC), 2000 WL 1234595, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2000) (granting motion to
dismiss because Lopez does not stand for the proposition that a finding of joint employer status
alone is sufficient for liability under FLSA's provisions against retaliation).
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In Lopez, the plaintiffs were hired by the Pak family to work as
garment pressers in the Paks' garment-sewing businesses, known first
as "Woo" and later as "Han" after Woo went out of business.324 Woo
and Han contracted to perform sewing and pressing operations for
Renaissance Sportswear, Ltd. ("Renaissance"), a garment manufacturer
of women's clothing.325 The plaintiffs claimed that Renaissance was
jointly liable for the nearly $10,000 in overtime wages owed by Han
and Woo, even though Renaissance neither exercised direct control over
the wages and hours of the plaintiffs nor possessed a role in the funding
and management of Woo or Han. 326 The Paks hired and supervised the
plaintiffs, set their hours and rates of pay, and prepared and managed
their payroll records. 327 Renaissance, however, supplied Woo and Han
with all the materials needed, as well as specifications for the finished
garments, and determined the production timetable, including turn-
around times for each job.328 Through its production manager,
Renaissance made almost daily visits to Han to inspect finished
garments. 329
Central to the suit was a dispute about which version of the multi-
factor economic realities test should apply. 33  Renaissance argued in
favor of the restrictive Carter factors, focusing on common law control,
while the plaintiffs proposed the more liberal Superior Care factors. 331
The court selected and combined factors from Rutherford Food Corp.,
Superior Care, and Torres-Lopez to adopt the following seven factors as
its joint employment analysis: (1) the extent to which the workers
perform a discrete job that is an integral part of the putative joint
employer's integrated production process; (2) whether the putative
employer's premises are used; (3) the extent to which the workers
perform exclusively for the putative employer; (4) the permanence or
duration of the relationship between the workers and the putative
employer; (5) the degree of control exercised by the putative employer;
(6) whether the responsibilities under the contract with the putative
employer pass without material changes from one group of potential
joint employees to another; and (7) whether the workers have a business
324. Lopez, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 408.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 408-10.
327. Id. at 408, 412.
328. Id. at 408.
329. Id. at 410.
330. Id. at418- 2 3.
331. Id. at 414; see supra notes 195-96 and accompanying text (discussing the Carter
factors); supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text (discussing the Superior Care factors).
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organization that could shift from one putative joint employer to
another. 332 The court also considered two factors that were based solely
on the factual record. These concerned the presence of embedded ties
and social relations between the Paks and Renaissance and the
acceptance of substandard work from the Paks by Renaissance. 333
Using these factors, the court found as a matter of law that
Renaissance was the joint employer of the plaintiffs during the time that
they worked at Han. 334 For the period when they worked at Woo, the
court held that disputed issues of fact regarding the kind of supervision
and control exercised by Renaissance over Woo employees, and the
extent of work performed by Woo for Renaissance, precluded summary
judgment for either party. 335
Certainly, the decision in Lopez represents a positive development in
the jurisprudence of joint employment in several respects. First, unlike
most joint employer decisions, the court engaged in a more rigorous
process of justifying its determination of the appropriate multi-factor
analysis. 336 By its own account, the court sought to avoid the arbitrary
selection of factors that could skew the decision one way or the other.337
The court conducted a factor-by-factor comparison of the cases that it
identified as most important on the issue-Rutherford Food Corp.,
Superior Care, and Torres-Lopez-and then explained its justification
for selecting or rejecting each factor.338 Second, the court expressly
acknowledged the power structures and dynamics of the subcontracting
system in the garment industry. 339 In explaining the analogy between
farm workers and garment workers, the court suggested that "the
dynamic between unskilled workers performing a discrete aspect of
production, middle-man contractors, and dominant, relationship-
defining owners" lies at the core of the economic dependency
analysis. 34  The court thus added legitimacy to what other courtdecisions had recognized-that garment manufacturers, far from acting
332. Lopez, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 419-20.
333. Id. at 422-23.
334. Id. at 423.
335. Id. at 423-24.
336. See id. at 413-20. Approximately eight pages of a nineteen-page opinion are devoted to
this issue alone.
337. Id. at 415.
338. Id. at 413-20.
339. Id. at 418.
340. Id.
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as "neutrals," are often the dominant force in the symbiotic relationship
that exists between garment manufacturers and their contractors. 341
The court recognized that this dynamic was clearly captured by the
factor that inquires into the extent to which the work performed by
garment production workers is an integral part of a manufacturer's
integrated production process. 34 2  It noted that Renaissance depended
entirely on contractors to perform routine production work that was
essential to its manufacturing process.343 Further, the court explained,"given the limited skill their work required, the Paks' employees'performed a routine line-job integral to [Renaissance's] business,'
and-along with other contractors performing different discrete tasks
essential to the manufacturing process-'were but one part of an
'integrated economic unit' operated by [Renaissance].' 344 This factor
most strongly favored a finding of joint employment.345
Moreover, the court's emphasis on "dominant-relationship defining"
manufacturers approximates the focus in Real, Torres-Lopez, and
Castillo on whom controlled decision making over the essential
determinants of profits and contract. 346  Sprinkled throughout the
opinion were references to Renaissance's determinative role in
supplying all the materials needed by Han and Woo; dictating the
standards, criteria, and specifications for finished garments; conducting
quality control inspections; and determining the production schedule. 347
In addition, the court highlighted the economic subservience of the Paks
341. See R.M. Perlman, Inc. v. I.L.G.W.U., 33 F.3d 145, 153 (2d Cir. 1994); see also
Greenstein v. Nat'l Skirt & Sportswear Ass'n, 178 F. Supp. 681, 687-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1959)
(describing the history of garment manufacturers shifting responsibility for employee conditions
to contractors by using an "outside system of production" in which "[t]he manufacturer and the
contractor, though functioning, theoretically, as separate entities, are engaged in an integrated
production effort"); Abeles v. Friedman, 14 N.Y.S.2d 252, 257 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1939). "'In
determining the relationship between jobber, submanufacturer, and workers we should be
concerned not so much with the form as with the substance"' and "'[bly whatever name he may
call himself, the jobber controls working conditions; he controls employment."' Abeles, 14
N.Y.S.2d at 257 (quoting the Governor's Advisory Commission in the cloak and suit industry).
342. Lopez, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 420.
343. Id.
344. Id. (quoting Antenor v. D & S Farms, 88 F.3d 925, 932 (11th Cir. 1996)) (alteration in
original).
345. Id.; see supra notes 224-31 and accompanying text (discussing joint employment
analysis factors).
346. See Lopez, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 418.
347. Id. at 408, 410, 420-21. This is similar to the court's discussion in Real and Torres-
Lopez that the farms controlled the major determinants of profit through decision making about
what to plant, how much to plant, when to plant and harvest, and how to market crops. See supra
notes 275-83 and accompanying text (discussing the Ninth Circuit's conclusions that the farms,
through profit decisions making, controlled the workers' wages).
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to Renaissance during contract negotiations, observing that Renaissance
dealt interchangeably with multiple contractors 348 and wielded
unilateral control over the contract price in establishing the piece rate
paid to the Paks. 349  Thus, the Paks had only minimal ability to
negotiate slightly higher rates since they "could be replaced by other
similarly situated contractors at Renaissance's whim." 35°  This
interchangeability of contractors was underscored by the court's
explanation that there were no material changes in the relationship
between Renaissance and the Paks' employees when Woo went out of
business and Renaissance then contracted with Han. 351
Despite these positive developments, several interpretive issues need
clarification to avoid the danger of exaggerating the relevance of factors
such as exclusivity, permanency, or regularity of ties between
manufacturers and contractors. These factors are, in essence,
incarnations of the control test and are at odds with how garment
subcontracting relationships are structured. When examined against
specific subcontracting practices, it becomes evident that factors such as
exclusivity of work performed and entwined ties should be subordinate
to the inquiry into economic dominance.
In Lopez, the court found that the semi-exclusive links between the
Paks and Renaissance helped to "demonstrate unequivocally" that Han
and its workers were dependent upon Renaissance "for the very
existence of work.",35 2  "It [was] undisputed ... that eighty-five to
ninety-five percent of Han's work was performed for Renaissance. '" 353
The court also stated that the existence of entwined ties and social
relations between the Paks and Renaissance made it "even more
obvious that Renaissance and the Paks' companies functioned at times
as an integrated economic unit, and thus, as joint employers. 354
Furthermore, the fact that Peter Pak left the employ of his parents'
business to ascend to the position of production manager at Renaissance
evidenced his intimate role in both businesses. 35 5 Peter acted as an
intermediary between his mother and Renaissance during contract
negotiations, and his mother occasionally accepted lower prices in order
348. Lopez, 14 F. Supp. 2d. at 422.
349. Id. at 409.
350. Id. at 422.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 421.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 422.
355. Id.
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to maintain good relations with Renaissance. 3 56 During frequent on-site
visits, Peter directly communicated with workers when they made
mistakes and instructed his mother when garments did not conform to
Renaissance specifications. 357
However, it would be unfounded to make these factors a focal inquiry
of whether a garment manufacturer is a joint employer. The court
acknowledged that exclusivity of work performed for the purported
joint employer "[was] not described in any decision of which this Court
[was] aware as a separate factor for consideration." 358  In fact, the
court's conclusion that exclusivity was highly probative of economic
dependency was not based on any examination of the patterns of
contractor-manufacturer relationships actually found in the industry. In
addition, it did not appear that the court was establishing entwined ties
of social relations and supervision as a new factor to apply in every
circumstance. The court made clear that the presence of entwined ties
through the role of Peter Pak was an aspect "wholly specific" to the
record.359
Most significantly, studies profiling the industrial structure of the
garment industry offer strong evidence that an emphasis on exclusivity
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 417. The court, however, believed that exclusivity was an implicit factor in almost
all joint employer cases, and pointed to Rutherford Food Corp. and Torres-Lopez as examples.
Id. To the extent that exclusivity has been addressed in joint employer cases, it has been
primarily in the context of seasonal work, such as in the agricultural industry. See Charles v.
Burton, 169 F.3d 1322 (11 th Cir. 1999); Ricketts v. Vann, 32 F.3d 71 (4th Cir. 1994); Brock v.
Mr. W Fireworks, Inc., 814 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir. 1987); Barrientos v. Taylor, 917 F. Supp. 375
(E.D.N.C. 1996); Haywood v. Barnes, 109 F.R.D. 568 (E.D.N.C. 1986).
The concept of exclusivity reflected a judicial attempt to account for the unique characteristics
of seasonal work. See Mr. W Fireworks, 814 F.2d at 1054 ("Seasonal workers are by nature
peripatetic. We thus hold that when an industry is seasonal, the proper test for determining
permanency of the relationship is not whether the alleged employees returned from season to
season, but whether the alleged employees worked for the entire operative period of a particular
season."); Haywood, 109 F.R.D. at 589 ("The fact that the plaintiffs and the farm labor
contractors worked only for the [farm owners] on a seasonal basis does not vitiate the essential
permanency of the relationship .... ). For these courts, whether workers labored exclusively for
the alleged employer was a way to displace the issue of permanency. See Haywood, 109 F.R.D.
at 589 ("However temporary the relationship may be it is nevertheless true that the relationship is
permanent to the extent that the migrants work[ed] only for the defendants during the season.").
359. Lopez, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 422. In Liu v. Donna Karan International, Inc., the court
rejected a manufacturer's claim that dismissal of a joint employer suit was proper where the
plaintiffs had not alleged the existence of facts similar to the additional factors in Lopez-
entwined ties between the contractor and manufacturer and the acceptance of substandard work
by the manufacturer. Liu v. Donna Karan Int'l, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 4221 (WK), 2001 WL 8595, at
*3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2001). The court explained that the absence of such facts was not
dispositive, stating: "Judge Cote looked at the additional factors because they were specific to the
record in Lopez." Id. at *3.
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and entwined ties would skew against a finding of joint employer status
where employment conditions are the most oppressive. 360
Consideration of these factors also risks deflecting attention from the
most important indicia of a garment manufacturer's joint employer
status-whether the work performed is an integral part of the
manufacturer's operations and whether the manufacturer economically
dominates the contractor. According to the studies, manufacturers use
contracting networks that typically consist of a few core contractors and
a "large constantly changing roster" of peripheral contractors. 3 6 1 Core
contractors are those with whom a manufacturer may develop semi-
exclusive and stable relations over time. 362  Yet, semi-exclusivity of
work for the manufacturer does not appear to be a chief characteristic.
True core contractors are usually larger factories that compete on the
basis of product quality and skills, rather than price. They invest in new
technologies and possess specialized skills and expertise.3 63  Other
contractors may establish semi-exclusive links with manufacturers, but
are marked by poor employment conditions because they are subject to
strong price pressures exerted by manufacturers. 364
Peripheral contractors and their workers, however, occupy perhaps
the most precarious position in the garment industry. These contractors
possess neither exclusive, regular, nor stable ties with manufacturers. 365
Their services may be used only occasionally by any particular
manufacturer, and they may perform small jobs for multiple
manufacturers and large contractors simultaneously. 366 Manufacturers
rely strategically on the use of peripheral contractors precisely because
360. See infra note 361 (citing to studies profiling the industrial structure of the garment
industry).
361. Florence Palpacuer, Subcontracting Networks in the New York Garment Industry:
Changing Characteristics in a Global Era 21 (1998) (unpublished paper prepared for workshop on
"Global Production, Regional Responses, and Local Jobs: Challenges and Opportunities in the
North American Apparel Industry," Duke University) (on file with author) [hereinafter Palpacuer,
Subcontracting Networks]; see FLORENCE PALPACUER, DEVELOPMENT OF CORE-PERIPHERY
FORMS OF ORGANIZATION: SOME LESSONS FROM THE NEW YORK GARMENT INDUSTRY 8-13
(1997) [hereinafter PALPACUER, CORE-PERIPHERY FORMS]; Herman, supra note 61, at 18-19;
Palpacuer, Subcontracting Networks, supra, at 14-17.
362. PALPACUER, CORE-PERIPHERY FORMS, supra note 361, at 8-9; Palpacuer,
Subcontracting Networks, supra note 361, at 14-18.
363. PALPACUER, CORE-PERIPHERY FORMS, supra note 361, at 11; Palpacuer, Subcontracting
Networks, supra note 361, at 20-21.
364. PALPACUER, CORE-PERIPHERY FORMS, supra note 361, at 13; Palpacuer, Subcontracting
Networks, supra note 361, at 16-17, 24.
365. PALPACUER, CORE-PERIPHERY FORMS, supra note 361, at 11-13; Palpacuer,
Subcontracting Networks, supra note 361, at 21.
366. See supra notes 340-41 and accompanying text (discussing the dominant relationship in
employing contractors).
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the lack of exclusive and stable ties affords the manufacturers flexibility
to exert a stiff downward pressure on prices. 367  Usually small and
undercapitalized, with limited managerial and production skills,
peripheral contractors compete on the basis of cost.368 Through intense
price competition, manufacturers extract very low prices from the
contractors, who possess little real ability to negotiate with them. 369
Consequently, wages, conditions, and safety standards in these factories
are among the most abysmal. These factories often close and reopen
under different ownership, 37 making it nearly impossible for workers
to recover unpaid wages. 371
Though labeled "peripheral," these contractors are a structural fixture
of garment subcontracting networks. They constitute the primary
mechanism by which manufacturers exert a downward pressure on
prices. Further, peripheral contractors are more numerous than core
factories. 372 This exploitation is especially true of those sectors of the
garment industry where Asian and Latin American immigrant workers
predominate.373 In addition, hyper-competition and volatility in the
garment industry make the line between core and peripheral contractors
a thin one.37 4 One's core status can easily dissolve and most peripheral
contractors do not become core contractors. 375 The pressure exerted on
peripheral factories to lower prices also forces core factories in the most
vulnerable sectors of the industry to succumb to lower prices in order to
maintain their position. 376  In this way, the wages and conditions in
peripheral factories are highly determinative of employment conditions
throughout the industry. 377
Garment subcontracting patterns reveal that the absence of exclusive,
regular, permanent, or entwined ties of the sort present in Lopez are not
367. PALPACUER, CORE-PERIPHERY FORMS, supra note 361, at 4, 12-13; Palpacuer,
Subcontracting Networks, supra note 361, at 15-16.
368. PALPACUER, CORE-PERIPHERY FORMS, supra note 361, at 12; Palpacuer, Subcontracting
Networks, supra note 361, at 21.
369. PALPACUER, CORE-PERIPHERY FORMS, supra note 361, at 12, 15; Palpacuer,
Subcontracting Networks, supra note 361, at 22.
370. PALPACUER, CORE-PERIPHERY FORMS, supra note 361, at 12.
371. See supra notes 108-23 and accompanying text (discussing the barriers to recovery of
wages).
372. PALPACUER, CORE-PERIPHERY FORMS, supra note 361, at 12.
373. Id. at 21-24.
374. For example, Palpacuer noted that "the growing range of peripheral contractors...
points to high vulnerability and precariousness in New York's garment production activities." Id.
at 24.
375. Id. at 11-12.
376. Id. at 12, 15.
377. Id. at 15.
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accurate indicators that a manufacturer is not a joint employer.37 8 These
factors present no problems for workers and contractors who represent
the core, just as the common law control test was an appropriate
standard for workers who fit the classic paradigm of master-servant. 379
However, the limitations of these factors surface as we move from the
core to the periphery. The kind of dependency ascertained by
exclusivity, regularity, or permanency is too narrow and simplistic to
capture significant aspects of how garment workers and contractors
who, at the periphery, are economically dependent upon a manufacturer.
If a contractor is so economically dominated by the manufacturer that
the contractor possesses virtually no meaningful ability to negotiate core
terms of the business relationship, its employees are as dependent upon
the manufacturer for the terms of their employment as they are on the
contractor. This dependence is true despite minimal links or contact
between the contractor and manufacturer.
V. PROTECTING SWEATSHOP GARMENT WORKERS:
SOME MODEST RECOMMENDATIONS
Workers will undoubtedly continue to invoke the economic realities
test and joint employer doctrine as sweatshop conditions persist in the
garment industry. However, progressive interpretive norms are needed
if the joint employer doctrine is to become an effective tool for helping
to eradicate sweatshops.
A. Exclusive, Permanent, or Regular Ties Between Contractors and
Manufacturers Should Be Accorded Little Weight in the
Joint Employer Standard
Exclusive, permanent, or regular ties between a manufacturer and a
garment contractor should bear no weight in the demarcation of the
outer limits of joint manufacturer liability for substandard wages and
conditions. Other commentators, too, call for the abandonment of these
factors as part of the economic realities test. 38  The absence of
378. See Brock v. Superior Care, 840 F.2d 1054, 1060-61 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that lack of
continuing or exclusive relationship with a temporary healthcare referral agency did not require a
finding that nurses were independent contractors). In Superior Care, the nurses who alleged that
the referral agency was their employer typically worked for other healthcare providers
simultaneously, worked for the agency only a small amount of the time, and usually maintained
no continuing relationship with the agency. Id. at 1057, 1060.
379. LINDER, supra note 181, at 14-15.
380. See id. at 238 (arguing that permanency and exclusivity are not useful factors in
ascertaining the existence of an employment relationship because they "serve ... to occlude
rather than to illuminate what dependence means"); Goldstein et al., supra note 33, at 1145-46
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exclusive, regular, or permanent ties does not accurately indicate the
economic independence of garment workers from the manufacturer. In
these circumstances, neither garment workers nor contractors depend
upon a single manufacturer as their sole source of income. Nonetheless,
many garment workers depend upon the manufacturer for the receipt of
minimum wages from the contractor who is their direct employer.
Peripheral contractors, who have unstable and non-exclusive links with
manufacturers, are the most economically powerless in the industry and
manufacturers typically pay them prices that are too low to support
compliance with FLSA requirements.
Several United States circuit courts of appeals have held that the
absence of exclusive, permanent, and regular ties between workers and
a purported employer bears little legal significance in determining the
existence of an employment relationship. 381  In Brock v. Superior
Care,382 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals explained that "even
where work forces are transient, the workers have been deemed
employees where the lack of permanence is due to operational
characteristics intrinsic to the industry rather than to the workers' own
business initiative." 383  The court held that a group of nurses were
employees rather than independent contractors of a healthcare referral
agency even though the nurses worked for several employers, earned a
small portion of their income from the agency, worked for the agency
for short periods, and usually maintained no continuing relationship
with the agency. 384 Neither the nurses' lack of reliance on the agency
as their sole source of income nor their transience nullified the existence
of an employment relationship. These patterns, the court reasoned,
(proposing a "suffer or permit to work" standard for joint employer liability under the FLSA that
would exclude factors such as exclusivity, permanency, and duration of the relationship).
381. These cases address whether a worker was an employee or independent contractor, and
are relevant to the joint employer inquiry because the principal issue is the same in both
contexts-what is the legal significance, if any, of the absence of exclusive, permanent or regular
ties in determining whether workers are economically dependent on an entity as their employer?
It makes no appreciable difference that joint employer liability requires an examination of the
contractor-manufacturer relationship to gauge worker dependency on the manufacturer.
Explications of why factors such as exclusive, permanent, or regular ties fail to capture core
aspects of dependency have equal force where the question is whether the contractor is so
economically subservient to the manufacturer that its employees are dependent upon the
manufacturer.
382. Brock v. Superior Care, 840 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1988).
383. Id. at 1060 (citation omitted). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Brock v. Mr. W
Fireworks, Inc., 814 F.2d 1042, 1053-54 (5th Cir. 1987), also stressed that judges must take into
account the operational characteristics particular or intrinsic to an industry when applying the
economic realities test.
384. Superior Care, 840 F.2d at 1060.
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reflected the "nature of their profession" and "characteristics intrinsic to
the industry" rather than their independence. 385
Likewise, the Fifth and Third Circuit Courts of Appeals have held
that an employment relationship cannot be defeated merely because the
purported employer is not the single or primary source of income. In
Halferty v. Pulse Drug Co.,386 a night dispatcher was held to be an
employee instead of an independent contractor even though she earned
less than half of her income from the ambulance service operator. 387
The Fifth Circuit explained that to conclude otherwise would permit
employers to avoid the employment relationship by paying workers so
little that they are relegated to relying on other sources of income. 388
Employers could escape liability by deliberately structuring
impermanent and exploitative economic relationships with workers for
that very purpose. 389 Similarly, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in
Donovan v. DialAmerica Marketing, Inc., held that what matters most is
not the percentage of total work performed for the alleged employer, or
the amount of work done, but whether the work is "an 'essential part' of
the alleged employer's business." 39° The court held that it was largely
irrelevant that home researchers supplied only four to five percent of the
telephone numbers of prospective customers sought by the firm.39 1
The absence of exclusive, permanent, or regular ties between
manufacturer and contractor, typical of most relationships with
contractors, is an operational characteristic that is intrinsic to how
manufacturers structure garment production. 392  Furthermore, the
structure of contracting relationships rests within the absolute control of
385. Id. at 1060-61.
386. Halferty v. Pulse Drug Co., 821 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1987).
387. Id. at 267. For another Fifth Circuit opinion on the issue, see Mr. W Fireworks, 814 F.2d
at 1054 ("Economic dependence is not conditioned on reliance on an alleged employer for one's
primary source of income, for the necessities of life.").
388. Halferty, 821 F.2d at 267-68.
389. As one commentator aptly observed, "fungible workers whose low wages dictate a
perpetual life of vulnerability on the margin are no less dependent on an employer for the fact that
they are formally free to work in quick succession-or simultaneously on different shifts or days
of the week-for several employers under the same conditions." LINDER, supra note 18 1, at 238.
390. Donovan v. DialAmerica Mktg., Inc., 757 F.2d 1376, 1385 (3d Cir. 1985) (citations
omitted). The court stated that "regardless of the amount of work done, workers are more likely
to be 'employees' under the FLSA if they perform the primary work of the alleged employer."
Id. There was no legal basis for concluding that home researchers were independent contractors
because their earnings from a magazine telemarketing firm was only a secondary source of
income for them. Id.
391. Id.
392. Only a narrow segment of contractor-manufacturer relationships are based on the sort of
entwined ties of trust and cooperation that spawn exclusive, permanent, or regular links.
Palpacuer, Subcontracting Networks, supra note 361, at 14-15, 20-22.
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manufacturers, subject to their manipulation. A manufacturer can avoid
exclusivity and entwined ties by hiring multiple contractors for small
jobs, strategically manipulating the volume of work between
contractors, constantly changing the roster of contractors used, and
minimizing supervisory or other contact with contractors. Indeed,
practitioners anticipate that manufacturers will restructure operations in
these ways to avert any potential finding of exclusivity. 393
B. Joint Liability Should Rest on Manufacturer Control of the Contract
and Determinants of Profits
The focal inquiry of the economic realities test should be who
dominates the contract between the manufacturer and contractor, and
who controls the essential determinants of profits. That is, the concept
of a "dependent contractor" should be explicitly incorporated into the
analysis of joint liability. Scholars and practitioners suggest that such a
category would be useful for identifying those who are entrepreneurs in
form, but who are so economically subservient to the engaging firm that
they are unable to meaningfully negotiate for decent remuneration and
benefits. 394  According to some critics, regardless of the distinction
between independent contractors and employees, dependent contractors
should enjoy the same legal protections granted to employees. 395 In the
joint employer context, however, the dependent contractor's economic
subordination to the manufacturer should give rise to joint liability
because the manufacturer effectively dictates the wages and conditions
of the dependent contractor's employees.
Current doctrine provides a basis for a sharper development of the
concept of dependent contractor as one who is economically subservient
393. Telephone Interview with Stanley Mark, Staff Attorney, Asian American Legal Defense
& Education Fund (Dec. 19, 2001); see also Elmore, supra note 21, at 434-35 (describing how
manufacturers and retailers could manipulate factors such as supervision, supply of materials,
duration, and proportion of work performed by the contractor).
394. See Marsha S. Berzon, Employer Evasion of Collective Bargaining and Employee
Protective Statutes Through Independent Contractor Status, 13 LAB. L. EXCHANGE 1, 12 (1994)
(describing the development of a new legal category under Canadian law for "dependent
contractors" as individuals who are "independent entrepreneurs, but who nonetheless are in such
a subservient position in relationship to the business for which they perform services that they
should be accorded the same protections and other economic rights as employees"); LINDER,
supra note 181, at 240 (positing that one approach for addressing the weaknesses of the current
economic realities test would be the creation of "a category of statutory or constructive
employees-that of 'dependent contractors,' 'uncontrolled employees,' or 'employee-like
persons'). Linder noted that these categories would recognize those self-employed workers
who, because of their lack of skill or market forces, are unable to "bargain successfully... for the
levels of compensation and ... benefits that employees have obtained through either collective
bargaining or state intervention." Id.
395. Berzon, supra note 394, at 12.
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to the engaging firm. 396  Real, Torres-Lopez, Castillo, and Lopez
demonstrated a willingness to address: (1) who, between the
manufacturer and contractor, controls the essential determinants of
profits or consequential decisions in the business; and (2) which parties
in a subcontracting arrangement dominate the contract.3 97  These
considerations should comprise the prevailing inquiry under the
economic realities test for subcontracting relationships in the garment
industry. Factors that illuminate this inquiry deserve the most weight
and should be treated as primary factors. There are five factors that
should be considered as primary.
Most critically, whether a contractor has the bargaining power to
negotiate higher prices from the manufacturer should be made an
explicit factor that is accorded great weight. Ample studies and
commentary document the market forces and industrial structure that
leave most contractors without a genuine ability to bargain successfully
for more favorable terms. 398  The court in Lopez acknowledged this
when it addressed whether the terms of the contract with the
manufacturer passed without material changes between workers hired
by successive contractors. 399
A second primary factor should be whether the price paid by the
manufacturer to the contractor is insufficient to ensure compliance with
minimum wage and overtime requirements. A closely related
consideration is whether the production requirements of the contract for
quantity and turnaround are too onerous to permit the payment of
overtime based on the contract price. When the contract price is too
low or production requirements too burdensome, the manufacturer
impinges upon the contractor's ability to pay decent wages and benefits;
the manufacturer should foresee a high likelihood of substandard wages
and excessive hours that will be uncompensated. Moreover, the
manufacturer is in a position to remedy such conditions through its
control of the contract price. The strong, direct, and foreseeable nexus
between low contract prices and sweatshop conditions justifies the
imposition of joint liability. Thus, courts should accord great weight to
evidence establishing that a manufacturer regularly engages in the
396. See supra Part III.C (discussing current application of the economic realities test).
397. See supra Part III.C (discussing the Real, Torres-Lopez, Castillo, and Lopez cases); see
also Part IV (same).
398. See supra notes 67-97, 338-40, 359-76 and accompanying text (discussing the
dominance of garment manufacturers over contractors based on market and industrial forces).
See generally WALDINGER, supra note 33; Herman, supra note 61.
399. See supra notes 345-50 and accompanying text (discussing the interchangeability of
contractors and the consequences from such ease of substitution).
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practice of contracting at unfairly low prices. Garment workers and
advocates also argue that a pattern and practice of contracting at
unfairly low prices should form the basis for independent theories of
liability outside of the joint employer doctrine. These include claims
based on civil RICO provisions, unfair business practices, tort law, and
contract law. 400  Certainly, the inability of contractors to negotiate
prices that would support compliance with labor standards calls for
piercing the fiction of liberty of contract in other competitive low-wage
industries as well.4 °1
A third factor that should be considered a primary one is who dictates
the criteria, specifications, and production timetables for the garment
work to be performed. These determinations are highly probative of
who dominates the contract and wields control over the major
determinants of profits or consequential decisions in the business. The
entity that decides what and how much to produce, and when to
produce, market and distribute, exercises control over all of the major
economic variables. While the court in Lopez did not identify control of
standards and production schedules as a separate factor for
consideration, this issue figured importantly in the court's decision.402
Finally, certain factors that are already a part of the economic
realities test should be viewed as primary factors. These include the
extent to which the work performed by garment workers is an integral
400. See Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F. Supp. 1450, 1459, 1461 (C.D. Cal. 1996). In
Bureerong, the workers alleged that garment manufacturers and factory operators had violated
RICO by engaging in an enterprise to deprive immigrant workers of their lawful wages through
fraud and extortion. Id. The workers also claimed that the defendants violated state laws
prohibiting unlawful and unfair business practices by causing the violation of multiple labor laws.
Id. Finally, the complaint alleged tort claims based on negligent hiring, supervision, and
entrustment. Id. In Qi Xian Wang v. Hua Great Procetech Inc., garment workers alleged similar
tort claims as well as a third-party beneficiary breach of contract claim. Second Am. Compl. at
paras. 64-78, 87-91, Qi Xian Wang v. Hua Great Procetech Inc., No. 98 CV 2786 (ILG) (RML)
(E.D.N.Y. June 18, 1998).
401. See Engelstein, supra note 287, at 322-23 (describing market forces in janitorial and
building maintenance similar to those in the garment industry that subject contractors to fierce
competition which include: low barriers to entry into the market, low-cost operations that
essentially sell unskilled labor, and contracts that are terminable at will.) These forces create
pressure on contractors to maximize output from workers or to shave costs in other ways. Id.
Engelstein concluded that in deciding whether the client firm is a joint employer, the NLRB"should determine, in a practical way, whether a contractor has the ability to bargain effectively
over core topics without the client providing reimbursement or additional compensation." Id. at
338; see also Becker, supra note 306, at 1543 (criticizing the refusal of the NLRB to consider
"[the reality that in a highly competitive, labor-intensive industry, such as janitorial service, the
amount of compensation paid by the owner to the contractor effectively determines the wages the
contractor pays its workers" (footnote omitted)).
402. See supra note 340 and accompanying text (discussing the Lopez Court's power structure
and dynamics analysis).
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part of a manufacturer's integrated production process and the degree of
skill required of the work. 03 If the work performed is a routine
function that is an integral part of the integrated production process of
the manufacturer, and little skill is involved, the manufacturer is in
essence "purchasing labor" to fulfill its "fundamental purpose." 404 The
contractor serves principally as an intermediary providing cheap labor
rather than a source of independent specialized expertise. Hence, the
duty to ensure compliance with labor standards should be regarded as a
non-delegable duty owed by the manufacturer. 40 5
C. The Standard for Joint Employer Should Be Developed on an
Industry-Specific Basis
The standard for determining who is a joint employer must be
industry-specific. Relationships between workers, contractors, and
client firms draw their specific content from the operational
characteristics that are intrinsic to an industry. 40 6  Accordingly,
industry-specific characteristics should inform judicial decision-making
about which factors should be regarded as primary under the joint
employer doctrine. In particular, courts should take into account the
unique employment structures, arrangements, and market forces that
403. See Goldstein et al., supra note 33, at 1136. "[I]ntegration ... becomes an ultimate
touchstone under the 'suffer or permit to work' standard." Id. at 1143. This proposal affixes
liability on a putative employer when it "acquiesce[s] in the performance of the work by these
workers and thereby suffer[s] it." Id. at 1136. However, a purported employer may defeat
liability by showing that the contractor's work was not integrated into its business. Id. at 1145
(noting that plaintiffs bear the burden to show sufferance and integration). When the intermediate
employer's business is not integrated into the putative employer's business, the putative employer
has neither the "means to know of [nor] the power to prevent the work." Id. at 1137-38, 1143-
46; see Elmore, supra note 21, at 435-36 (proposing state laws that presume a joint employment
relationship unless the manufacturer or retailer could prove "the contractor's lack of integration
and interchangeability in the entity's production process").
404. Pl.'s Notice of Mot. & Mot. for Partial Summ. J. at 13, Bureerong v. Uvawas. 922 F.
Supp. 1450 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
405. See DOBBS, supra note 194, at § 337, for an explication of the bases upon which courts
recognize that an enterprise cannot discharge its obligation of reasonable care by hiring
independent contractors. Courts generally conclude that some duties cannot be delegated because
the enterprise is in a position to select financially solvent contractors and reaps the benefits of the
contractor's work. Id. § 337, at 921. For instance, this justification is triggered when there are
statutory duties involved, the contractor pursues the interest of the enterprise, and the breaches of
the contractor are predictable. Id. § 337, at 924.
406. See generally Goldstein et al., supra note 33, at 991-1002 (describing the industrial
structure and organization of production in the agricultural and garment industries); id. at 1146-
54 (comparing the application of the "suffer or permit to work" standard in these industries);
Christian Zlolniski, The Informal Economy in an Advanced Industrialized Society: Mexican
Immigrant Labor in Silicon Valley, 103 YALE L.J. 2305 (1994) (analyzing the role of different
kinds of subcontracting practices in restructuring the janitorial industry in Silicon Valley).
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pattern subcontracting relationships in an industry. An industry-specific
focus would also help courts to recognize categories of joint employer
issues instead of conflating all joint employer issues. While a diversity
of work relationships with specific circumstances abounds in any
industry, these relationships are neither unordered nor anarchic. There
is an industrial organization to these relationships that implicates
various kinds of dependency issues. As courts develop a typology of
joint employer issues and how these issues overlap, a sharper judicial
understanding of economic dependency will emerge. 40 7
An industry-specific focus on patterns of relationships requires courts
to look at individual actors in their class and institutional structures.
Yet, the fiction of liberty of contract extracts individual actors from
their institutional structures. Courts should remember the more liberal
ideology that developed during the New Deal for viewing labor.
Current restrictive versions of the joint employer test are vestiges of a
past, discredited by the changed ideology of the New Deal.
The rich literature documenting the industrial structure and market
forces in the garment industry should quell concerns about the
appropriateness of piercing the fiction of liberty of contract between
workers, contractors, and manufacturers. Numerous studies, reports,
and commentaries from social scientists, labor economists,
governmental entities, and practitioners document the longstanding
history of garment sweatshops. These studies consistently identify the
shifting of responsibility for wages and conditions by "dominant-
relationship defining" 40 8 manufacturers onto marginal contractors as the
root cause of garment sweatshops. Given the breadth and consistency
of this considerable literature over time, courts should take judicial
notice of the industrial structure and market forces that produce
marginal garment contractors and dominant manufacturers. This
information should be viewed as part of the joint employer doctrine, not
subject to re-litigation.
Lastly, the notion of economic dependency, which lies at the heart of
the economic realities test, must account for employer efforts to
institutionalize "non-dependency." Courts should not permit employers
407. Joint employer issues arise in several contexts: the interposition of intermediaries and
middlepersons through subcontracting in low-wage industries, the leasing of employees through
referral and temporary agencies, and the misclassification of employees as independent
contractors. Middleton, supra note 181, at 564-70 (describing the various categories of work
arrangements and types of workers encompassed within the term "contingent workers").
Identifying the unifying strands in the dependency issues raised by each context will point to core
principles about economic dependency.
408. Lopez v. Silverman, 14 F. Supp. 2d 405, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
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to defeat joint employer liability by deliberately structuring
impermanent, unstable, and exploitative relationships. The concept of
economic dependency should encompass workers whose employment
has been strategically de-linked from features that are associated with"standard" employment-contractual privity, specific control,
permanency, and exclusivity.
VI. CONCLUSION
Garment workers face tremendous barriers in securing basic
workplace rights under current laws. The virtual immunity of retailers,
manufacturers, and contractors from liability for labor law violations
renders the right to be paid for one's work illusory for countless
garment workers. The economic reality of the garment subcontracting
system is that workers who number among the working poor are robbed
of untold sums of wages.
The most direct means of providing immediate relief to sweatshop
garment workers would be the reform of federal and state laws to create
an independent basis for holding manufacturers and retailers liable
when the prices they pay contractors are too low to assure compliance
with the FLSA.409 Those who contract out the production of garment
apparel could be required to bear the burden of proof that their contract
rates were calculated to support the payment of minimum wages and
overtime pay. They could also be required to pay some additional
percentage of the contract price to cover the contractor's overhead.
These measures, however, would meet stiff resistance from those who
adhere to the entrenched notion that private parties should be left free to
structure their contractual relationships.
As garment workers and advocates continue to press for legislative
reform, courts should recognize the promise of the joint employer
doctrine as a valuable means of redress. This Article recommends
interpretive norms for safeguarding the joint employer standard from a
highly restrictive construction that would deprive most garment workers
of protection. The joint employer doctrine should focus on piercing the
fiction of liberty of contract between contractors and manufacturers.
The greatest promise of the joint employer doctrine lies in its potential
409. For other kinds of legislative reforms, see Stop Sweatshops Act, H.R. 90, 106th Cong.
§ 14(a) (2001) (holding manufacturers who contract with factory operators liable for wage
violations to the same extent as the operator); Hiatt, supra note 319, at 751 (recommending that
administrative agencies presume "employee" status of workers hired in certain low-wage and
low-skilled sectors); Elmore, supra note 21, at 434-38 (recommending a version of the economic
realities test that looks at whether employees are economically dependent on the putative
employer).
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for bringing doctrine and jurisprudence in line with the economic
realities of low-wage workers in subcontracted employment.
